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Managing Free Trade in Early Modem Europe: Institutions, 
Information, and the Free Port of Livorno* 
Corey Tazzara 
Scripps College 
In November 1644, the ship captain Sebastiane Ferro arrived at the Tuscan port of 
Livomo with a cargo of wine. Even before requesting the pratica of the port-
entry for the purpose of trade-he asked to receive the exemptions of Livomo, 
"to be sure that in corning onto land he not be molested either in his person or in 
his goods for civil debts contracted in foreign states."1 Technically, these exemp-
tions were restricted to inhabitants of the city. Nonetheless, the Customs Office 
routinely granted them even to temporary visitors of what was Europe's premier 
free port, and in this case Customs Director Pandolfo Attavanti was happy to 
oblige Ferro. What happened next was therefore quite unexpected. While the 
regular governor was out roving the Mediterranean with the grand duke's 
ships, several creditors of Ferro persuaded the acting governor to clap the captain 
into prison, disable his vessel, and seize his cargo. Attavanti was furious. He de-
clared that this violation of the port's liberties gave merchants a lot to worry about 
regarding their safety in Livomo. Captains ought to be protected from such out-
rages by the "public faith and the freedom of the port." Even in more restrictive 
places such as Genoa and Civitavecchia, ship captains were given a "golden 
bridge" in the general interests of commerce. The customs director feared that the 
attack on Ferro was symptomatic of a new approach by the auditore ofLivomo, 
the governor's chieflegal counselor. In the preceding months an Armenian and a 
Venetian who also ought to have been protected by the port 's generous freedoms 
had also fallen victim to the auditore's zeal. "I don't know whether I have said 
too much," Attavanti apologized at the end of a rambling letter to the secretary of 
*I would like to thank Cljfford Ando, Philippe Buc, Catherine Chou, Paula Find len, Lu-
cia Frattarelli Fischer, Noah Millstone, Jeffrey Miner, James Shaw, Francesca Trivellato, 
the participants of the Stanford Medieval and Early Modem workshop, and three anony-
mous reviewers for their invaluable assistance in developing tills article. Any remainjng 
errors are my own. 
1 Archivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF), Mediceo del Principato (MP), 2 160, f. 102, 011 
31/1644. The author of this letter was almost certainly Pandolfo Attavanti, although the 
cover sheet to his letter is missing. In the footnotes I have retained the Florentine manner of 
dating the new year to March 25. 
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war in Florence. "I am not angry with anyone but am only obeying Your Ex-
cellency's orders."2 
What did free trade mean, and what was a free port in early modem Europe? 
With centralizing states still unable to establish strong control over their periph-
eries, how did governments manage the increasing velocity and quantity of trade? 
Livomo's officials had as much difficulty as modem historians in answering these 
questions. The detention of Ferro 's ship spawned a good deal of paperwork and 
bureaucratic infighting, which officials attributed first to the disorganization of 
the relevant legislation but ultimately to the informal customs of the port. The 
creditors asserted that Ferro's brother, a corsair, had absconded with prizes on a 
venture they had invested in, but the details of the case did not interest officials.3 
At stake was the fundamental nature of the port. When the regular governor re-
turned to his office, he disavowed his substitute's actions . The governor did not 
prosecute ship captains for debt even when they did not explicitly enjoy the ex-
emptions ofLivomo.4 In any case, he preferred to address what he believed to be 
the underlying problem: the haphazard organization of the laws and decrees on 
the subject. Over the next few weeks, legal officials, the governor, and the cus-
toms director scoured their archives for documents to shed light on the issue.5 
Customs Director Attavanti asserted on the basis of decrees that the grand dukes 
had always permitted free comings and goings: "all ships can put in here and pay 
the anchorage fee and ask for whatever exemptions and safe-conducts they need 
before stepping onto the land. This is a very usual practice.•>6 He granted the ex-
emptions to whoever showed up: "Regarding their examination, the whole affair 
is settled thus: when they are foreigners I ask them whether they have debts with 
Tuscan subjects or inhabitants; they respond that they have debts with aliens and 
foreigners; and I cannot deny them [the privileges]."7 Attavanti explained that this 
had always been the behavior of his predecessors at the Customs Office, even 
though no law authorized his office to grant the city's exemptions.8 
When the secretary of war pressed him further on the issue, Attavanti made a 
blanket appeal to the traditions of the free port. Although the customs director 
2 Ibid. 
3 Archivio di Stato di Livomo (ASL), Capitano poi Govematore poi Auditore vicario 
(CGA), 2603, vol. I , ff. 80 1,8 18. 
4 ASF, MP, 2160, ff. 124- 25, 02/06/ 1644. 
5 Ibid., ff. 163, 194, 206, 223, 564, 565, and an unfoliated letter from Alessandro 
Vettori dated 02/2311644. These letters were all written in February 1645 by our dating 
system. 
6 Ibid., f. 157, 02113/ 1644. 
7 Ibid., f. 132, 02/16/1644. 
8 Attavanti did produce a record that showed the customs director was responsible for 
enrolling people into the port's privileges as early as 1603. fbid; see also ASL, CGA, 2602, 
vol. 2, f. 317 (1627). 
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admitted that his own chancellery did not contain "all of the old documents," he 
emphasized that the most important charter, known as the Livomina of 1591/ 
1593, "does not embrace the full extent of the free port." He suggested that the 
full panoply of decrees was stored with the Privy Council in Florence but that 
it hardly mattered in any case: practice was more important than documentary 
precedent in creating a hospitable trade regime. Everybody knew that the custom 
was that "even our enemies the Turks have enjoyed and continue to enjoy the 
freedom of this port.' >9 They were granted trade exemptions in Livomo by virtue 
of its character as a free port. Attavanti won his point, and his office continued to 
manage exemptions as in the past. But the significance of the episode lay in his 
willingness to ground specific policies on a general conception of the free port. 
On its surface, the Sebastiana Ferro episode was a conflict between Attavanti and 
Livomo's chieflegal official over the limits of exemptions in the city. But the de-
bate was responsible for elevating various ducal decrees and bureaucratic prac-
tices into canons of local policy. In turn, this helped transform a fluid notion of 
Livomo 's liberties into a practical sense of the free port. 
Livomo played a privileged role in early modem discussions about free ports, 
and its experiences came to epitomize both the policy's advantages and its lim-
itations.10 The city was famous for its regime of toleration, its flourishing foreign 
communities, the simplicity of its customs procedures (after 1676), and its per-
vasive atmosphere of liberty. 11 Contemporary pamphleteers regularly cited Li-
vomo in their arguments about free ports. The Whig commercial publicist Sir 
Francis Brewster, who leveled one of the earliest critiques of the institution in his 
1695 treatise, found it necessary to begin by analyzing the success of Livomo, 
"because I take that in all its Circumstances to be the first Complete Precedent 
9 ASF, MP, 2160, f. 187,02/ 19/ 1644. 
10 Ports resembling free ports in terms of openness to foreigners and low customs duties 
were widespread in antiquity. Nevertheless, there is little continuity between ancient 
discussions of port policy (found most explicitly in Xenophon 's Poroi, which advocated 
welcoming foreigners for fiscal purposes) and political economy in the seventeenth 
century. See Robert B. Revere, '"No Man's Coast': Ports of Trade in the Eastern Medi-
terranean," in Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory, 
ed. Karl Polanyi et al. (New York, 1957), 38-63; Karl Polanyi , "Ports of Trade in Early 
Societies," Journal of Economic History 23, no. I (1963): 30- 45; Alain Bresson and 
Pierre Rouillard, eds., L'emporion (Paris, 1993); Nicholas Purcell, "The Ancient Medi-
terranean: The View from the Customs House," in Rethinking the Mediterranean, ed. by 
William V. Harris (Oxford, 2005), 200-232. 
11 For example Michel Guyot de Merville, Voyage historique d' ita lie (LaHaye, 1729), 
549- 57; Jean-Baptiste Labat, Voyages du P Labat de l'ordre des FF Precheurs en 
Espagne et en ltalie (Amsterdam, 1731 ), 2:79- 106; Thomas Nugent, The Grand Tour 
(London, 1778 [1749]), 3:374- 77. 
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in Europe." 12 Livomo's example deeply influenced the spread of the institution.13 
It is useful to identify four phases in the geographic expansion of free ports. The 
first was a Tyrrhenian period, roughly from 1591 to 1650. Goaded by the success 
ofLivomo, Genoa and the Savoyard ports ofVillefranche and Nice adapted free 
port policies to their needs. There followed an expansionary phase, roughly 1650 
to 1740, when free ports appeared throughout western Europe and especially 
around the Italian peninsula. The most well known of these included Trieste, An-
cona, Naples, Messina, Marseilles, Tangier, Dunkirk, and Althona. By the mid-
eighteenth century colonial powers were creating a number of such ports in the 
Caribbean Sea, including in Martinique, Guadeloupe, Tobago, Jamaica, and Saint-
Domingue (Haiti). Later they spread to East Asia and North America. Thus free 
ports were first an Italian, then a western European, later an Atlantic, and ulti-
mately a global phenomenon (table l ). 
Historians often place free ports in the context of centralizing states and re-
lentless international competition. In his classic work, Louis Dermigny stated 
baldly that "the free port is a modem reality, created by and imprinted with cen-
tralizing states and the mercantilist orientation of their policies." 14 More recently, 
Thomas Allison Kirk has argued that the Genoese free port aimed to help the 
small Ligurian state stay politically independent and commercially prosperous 
in a Mediterranean dominated by large nation-states. 15 Scholarship on Livomo 
likewise portrays the free port as the creature of three grand dukes in three discrete 
instances: Cosimo I (the Customs Reform of 1566), Ferdinanda I (the Livornina 
of 1591/1593), and Cosimo III (the Customs Reform of 1676). Save for a reform 
12 Francis Brewster, Essays on Trade and Navigation in Five Parts (London, 1695), 
29. Geographical dictionaries usually remarked on Livomo's status as a free port, too, even 
when they withheld that moniker from other ports that claimed the title, such as Genoa. 
For example, Lucas de Linda, Le relationi et descrittioni universa/i et particolari del 
mondo, trans. Maiolino Bisaccioni (Venice, 1664), 40. 
13 Alberto Caracciolo, "Il dibattito sui ' porti franchi' nel Settecento: Genesi della fran-
chigia di Ancona," Rivista storica ita/iana 75, no. 3 ( 1963): 538- 58; Louis Derrnigny, 
"Escales, echelles et ports francs au moyen age et aux temps moderns," in Les grandes 
escales (Brussels, 1974), 521-626; Josef W. Konvitz, Cities and the Sea: Port City 
Planning in Early Modem Europe (Baltimore, 1978); Jesper Meijling, "La lenta diffusione 
di un modello: Tl porto franco da Livomo a Marstrand nel settecento," Nuovi studi livornesi 
17 (2010): 95- 120. The free port is the forebear of the modem free trade zone (FTZ) and 
export-processing zone (EPZ). See Richard S. Thoman, Free Ports and Foreign-Trade 
Zones (Centreville, MD, 1956); Robert J. McCalla, "The Geographical Spread of Free 
Zones Associated with Ports," Geoforum 21, no. 1 (1990): 121-34; Jean-Pierre Singa 
Boyenge, "ILO Database on Export Processing Zones (Revised)," April2007, p. l , http:// 
www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/i lo/2007 / 1 07B09 _80_engl.pdf. 
14 Derrnigny, "Escales, echelles et ports francs," 522. 
15 Thomas Allison Kirk, Genoa and the Sea: Policy and Power in an Early Modern 
Maritime Republic, 1 559- J 684 (Baltimore, 2005), 151- 85. 
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TABLE I 
Fmsr-T!ME FREE PoRT D ECLARATIONS, EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS, 1591-1790 
City Year City Year 
Livomo 1591 Montego Bay (Jamaica) 1766 
Genoa 1595 Nassau (Bahamas) 1766 
Nice 1613 Prince Rupert Bay (Dominica) 1766 
Villefranche 1613 Roseau (Dominica) 1766 
Civitavecchia 1630 Saint George (Granada) 1766 
La Spezia 1643 Santa Lucca (Jamaica) 1766 
Tangier 1662 Savanna Ia Mar (Jamaica) 1766 
Venice 1662 Mole Saint-Nicolas (Haiti ) 1767 
Althona 1664 Marstrand 1775 
Dunkirk 1665 Ostend 1781 
Marseilles 1669 Saint John (Virgin Islands) 1781 
Curar;:ao 1675 Saint Thomas (Virgin Islands) 1781 
Gibraltar 1706 Cap Franr;:ais (Haiti) 1784 
Trieste 1719 Cayes (Haiti ) 1784 
Fiume 1719 Lorient 1784 
Ancona 1731 Pointe a Pitre (Guadeloupe) 1784 
Naples 1739 Port au Prince (Haiti ) 1784 
Monte Cristi (Haiti ) 1760 Saint-Pierre (Martinique) 1784 
Sainte-Luce (Martinique) 1765 Scarborough (Tobago) 1784 
Kingston (Jamaica) 1766 Sebastopol 1786 
Kingstown (Saint-Vincent) 1766 Port Louis (Mauritius) 1787 
SouRCES.--Coded from Louis Dermigny, "Escales, echelles et ports francs au moyen age et aux temps 
modems," in Les grandes escales (Brussels, 1974). Dennigny does not include a discussion of Venice or of 
Tangier, which was made a free port by Charles II. See By the King, a proclamation declaring His Majesties 
pleasure to settle and establish a free port at his city of Tanger in Africa (London, 1662); Massimo Costantini, 
"La regolazione dei dazi marittimi e l'esperienza del 'portoti'anco' a Venezia trail 1662 e il 1664," in Lafinanza 
pubblica in eta di crisi, ed. Antonio Di Vittorio (Bari, 1993), 77- 88. 
Ncm;.--since the term did not always appear in legislation, contextualized readings determine what counted 
as a free port. Some ports had their privileges revoked after more or less time; other.; saw their privileges fall into 
desuetude or vitiated by later legislation; still other.; experienced an expansion of privileges. 
of 1643 that temporarily restricted privileges, the free port appears to have 
expanded progressively at these three moments. 16 This view descends from the 
eighteenth-century jurists of Livomo who first discussed the free port in histor-
ical terms. At least some jurists were aware that the story was more complicated 
16 Mario Baruchello, Livorno e il suo porto: Origini, caratteristiche e vicende dei 
trajfici livornesi (Livomo, 1932); Femand Braude! and Ruggiero Romano, Navires et 
m.archandises a l' entree du port de Livourne (1 547-1611) (Paris, 1951 ); Lucia Frattarelli 
F~scher, "Livomo citta nuova: 1574- 1609," Societa e storia II ( 1989): 873-93; Frattarelli 
Fischer, "Livomo 1676: La citta e il porto franco," in La Toscana nell' eta di Cosima III, ed. 
by Franco Angiolini et al. (Florence, 1993); Frattarelli Fischer, Vivere foori dal ghetto: 
Ebrei a Pisa e Livorno (secoli XVI-XVII!) (Turin, 2008); Jean Pierre Filippini, Il porto di 
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than it seemed. One remarked on the "infinite amplifications and declarations" 
that constituted the free port and noted the distinction between "written law," on 
the one hand, and "particular orders, practice, and custom," on the other. 17 But 
like the historians who have followed them, jurists preferred to base their nar-
ratives on the grand legislation. There are serious problems with this approach. 
While it is easy to see purposive state action in the decision to construct port 
infrastructure and invite foreigners to settle in Livomo, the term "free port" was 
not even mentioned, let alone defined, in the chief legislation. It remained vague 
in both its sphere--did it pertain primarily to merchants or to their goods?-and 
in its detailed provisions. 
Uncertainties about Livomo's fundamental laws caused periodic confusion, 
and bureaucratic procedures both formal and informal proved as decisive as leg-
islation in shaping the free port. The Medici had no regular institutional channels 
with which to craft strategic policy or analyze the workings of their customs re-
gimes. Instead, they delegated control over policy development to poorly su-
pervised local officials. This "choice" was made without careful consideration 
but it fully partook of the larger institutional logic of the grand duchy. 18 Policy 
making by the periphery nonetheless provided an excellent mechanism for 
Livorno e Ia Toscana (1676-1814) (Naple , 1998); Samuel Fettah, "Livourne: Cite du 
prince, cite marchande (XVle-XIXe siecles)," in Florence et Ia Toscane: Les dynamiques 
d'un Etat italien, XIVe-XIX siecles, ed. Jean Boutier et al. (Rennes, 2004), 179-95; Andrea 
Addobbati, Commercia, rischio, guerra: Jl mercato delle assicurazioni marittime di 
Livorno (1694-1795) (Rome, 2007); Renato Ghezzi, Livorno e il mondo islamico nel 
XVII secolo: Naviglio e commercia di importazione (Bari, 2007), 197-2 19; Francesca 
Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-
Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven, CT, 2009) . For precedents, see 
Paolo Castignoli, "lmmunita, esenzioni e privilegi concessi ai nuovi abitatori di Livomo 
dal 1286 alia nascita della citta medicea," in Livorno: Dagli archivi alia citta, ed. Lucia 
Frattarelli Fischer and Maria Lia Papi (Livomo, 2001 ), 33- 37; Stephan R. Epstein, 
"Market Structures," in Florentine Tuscany : Structures and Practices of Power, ed. 
William J. Connell and Andrea Zorzi (Cambridge, 2000), 90-121. On the early customs 
regime, see Brunella Mannini, "La riforma della Dogana di Livomo del 1566," Studi 
livornesi 7 (1992): 65-107. 
17 ASL, Govemo civile e rnilitare di Livomo (Govemo), 1025. Modem historians have 
likewise noted the gradual development of the free port by means of decrees or generous 
interpretations of the law, but they have nonetheless emphasized ducal initiative through-
out the period from 1566 to 1676. The goal in this article is to explain why, as Baruchello 
put it, a "spirit of unlimited favor towards commerce" animated officials in Livomo despite 
changing conditions in the Mediterranean and the grand duchy (see Baruchello, Livorno e 
il suo porto, 125,267, 292, 367- 71 ). 
18 I treat policy as a web of decisions, taken over a long period of time and by a variety 
of actors. It need not be centrally directed. See Michael Hill, The Policy Process in the 
Modern State (New York, 1997); Michael Moran et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Public Policy (Oxford, 2006); Michael Hill and Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy, 
2nd ed. (London, 2009). 
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managing Livomo 's unpredictable expansion in the seventeenth century. Local 
officials, bound to merchants by ties of collaboration, were responsive to the de-
sires of the business community in ways that increased port traffic, promoted 
foreign settlement, and furthered freedom in the marketplace. 19 
At the same time that historians have seen free ports as "entirely a modem 
act,"20 they also have celebrated them as centers of cosmopolitan toleration in a 
Europe wracked by religious divisions and monopoly restrictions. Accordingly, 
historians have tended to accept the ideal definition of the term provided by 
the brothers Savary in their Dictionary of Commerce ( 1723). For them and their 
later readers, free ports were places where merchants of any ethnicity or reli-
gion were free to trade on equal terms and where storage and transit duties were 
norninal. 21 This definition obscures the question of the development of the free 
port as a set of practices and a discursive tool. The Medici grand dukes who 
crafted Livomo's legislation and the merchants who settled there did not have 
the Savary definition in mind when they used the term "free port." A specific 
notion developed gradually in the first half of the seventeenth century. The prac-
tices examined in this article created a free marketplace open to virtually all com-
ers, but a marketplace constituted by a thicket of bureaucratic intricacies. The 
complexities of free trade in Livomo helped spur radical legislation in 1676 
whereby the grand duke eliminated import/export duties and imposed a uni-
form tariff for commercial services. Livomo helped invent free trade for all 
nations, but its path was winding and unpredictable. 
This article has four sections. The first examines the evolution of the trading 
framework in Livomo from the customs law of 1566 to the celebrated Reform 
19 By contrast, the Genoese favored a legislative path in their Republic's elusive goal of 
competing with Livomo. Guided by the expertise of the Casa di San Giorgio, which 
administered the customs and the public debt, the Genoese government crafted a new free 
port law every five or ten years to adjust the shortcomings of previous laws. The Genoese 
free port did not exert an important influence over the discursive or practical spread of free 
ports, however. Giulio Giacchero, Storia economica del Settecento genovese (Genoa, 
1951 ), pt. I ; see also his Origini e sviluppo del portofranco genovese (Genoa, 1972); 
Thomas Allison Kirk, "Genoa and Livomo: Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Commer-
cial Rivalry as a Stimulus to Policy Development," Journal of the Historical Association 
86, no. 281 (200 I): 3- 17, and also Kirk, Genoa and the Sea, 151-85. 
2
° Caracciolo, "II dibattito," 539. 
21 
"C'est un port ou il est libre a tous marchands, de quelque nation qu ' ils soient, de 
decharger leurs marchandises, & de les en retirer lorsqu'ils ne les ont pu vendre sans payer 
aucun droit d 'entree ni di sortie .... Se dit aussi de Ia franchise totale & de I' exemption 
qu'ont les marchands, de tous droits, soit pour les marchandises qu'ils apportent dans les 
ports de quelque Etat, so it pour celles du erG du Pays qu ' ils en veulent remporter." Jacques 
Savary des Brulons and Philemon-Louis Savary, Dictionnaire universe! de commerce, 3rd 
ed. (Paris, 1748 [1723]), 3:962. Compare the distinction between an "entrepot" (a free port 
for merchandise) and an "emporium" (a free port for merchants) in Kirk, Genoa and the 
Sea, 155 . 
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of 1676. Section II analyzes the political institutions that made the free port 
possible, especially the practice of supplication whereby individuals lobbied lo-
cal officials for ducal favors. It shows that the informational problems inherent in 
administering the free port had important consequences for policy outcomes. 
Section III argues that the policy process in Livomo illuminates larger problems 
in European political economy during the seventeenth century. Institutions 
played a critical though varying role in shaping economic discourse throughout 
Europe. A brief conclusion then highlights the implications of this study for our 
understanding of free ports in early modem Europe. 
I. THE FREE PoRT AS A WoRK IN PROGRESs 
Establishing direct ties with Spain for purchasing raw wool and with the Levant 
for selling finished textiles were long-standing ambitions of the Tuscan elite.22 
Since the old medieval harbor ofPisa had silted up by the early sixteenth cen-
tury, the Medici grand dukes needed to construct a new port to achieve these 
goals. They offered extensive privileges and made large investments in Livomo, 
then a backwater port ignored by the currents of international commerce. In 
1566, Cosirno I reformed the town's customs administration. Although the re-
form was more a consolidation of prior arrangements than a novel tax regime, it 
enshrined the low storage and transit duties that would make Livomo an at-
tractive place to do business. A decade later Francesco I commissioned the grand 
duchy's finest architect, Bernardo Buontalenti, to design a city capable of ac-
commodating some ten thousand people. In the meantime, the grand dukes also 
built basic port facilities: a channel for connecting Livomo to the Amo River 
and a pier, fortified walls, and warehouses for storing grain or other goods. Fran-
cesco, following in his father's footsteps, also took measures to establish silk 
cultivation in Tuscany itself and to attract a range offoreign artisans to his realm. 
Francesco's industrial policy enjoyed substantial success, especially in luxury 
crafts_23 The grand duke's difficulty in luring private real estate investors to his 
new port slowed construction in Livomo, however, and his failure to secure a 
reciprocal trading agreement with the Ottoman Empire frustrated the regime's 
commercial goals. 
22 Michael E. Mallet, The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford, I 967). 
23 Judith C. Brown, "Concepts of Political Economy: Cosimo I de ' Medici in a Com-
parative European Context," in Firenze e Ia Toscana dei Medici nell' Europa del '500: 
Strumenti e veicoli della cultura. Relazioni politiche ed economiche (Florence, 1983), 
279-93; Rita Mazzei, Pisa Medicea: L' economia cittadina da Ferdinanda I a Cosima III 
(Florence, I 991 ); Giuseppe Vittorio Pari gino, II tesoro del principe: Funzione pubblica e 
privata del patrimonio dellafamiglia Medici nel cinquecento (Florence, I 999), I 66- 76; 
Luca Mola, "Artigiani e brevetti nella Firenze del cinquecento," in La grande storia dell' 
artigianato, ed. Franco and Gloria Fossi Franceschi (Florence, 2000), 3:57- 79. 
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Ferdinando I abandoned the capitulatory approach pursued by his predeces-
sor. Settlement in Livomo would not be based on bilateral agreements between 
sovereigns, but rather upon a set of privileges granted unilaterally by the regime. 
Livorno's big opportunity came when famine struck Italy in 1590. At once anx-
ious to secure adequate grain and attentive to the wider commercial prospects 
of his state, the grand duke invited foreign merchants to settle in the port of 
Livorno. He issued a broad call for settlement known as the Livornina ( 15911 
1593) addressed to "all you merchants of whatever nation-Easterners, West-
erners, Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks, Germans, Italians, Jews, Turks, Moors, 
Armenians, Persians, and [those] of other states."24 The Livornina offered mer-
chants immunity from prosecution for debts contracted outside of the state, 
freedom from criminal prosecution, tax exemptions, and a host of privileges 
specifically for Jews. These measures were distinctive not because of any single 
provision but because, unlike other monarchs of the period, the Medici actually 
stuck by and even augmented them.25 Officials adopted a pragmatic policy that 
quickly grew to encompass a large measure of toleration for all foreigners in 
the city.26 
Growth in Livorno was slow but steady amidst the prevailing stagnation of the 
Italian economy. In 1590, Livorno was a malaria-ridden village of five hundred 
inhabitants. By 1642 it had about 12,000 people, including a large population of 
Jews and various small but dynamic communities of foreign merchants? 7 For 
several decades, grain and wool were its most important imports, the former to 
feed the Tuscan population, the latter to supply the Florentine textile industry. 
Over the course of the seventeenth century, however, Livorno came to serve func-
tions quite unanticipated by the grand dukes. Relatively low duties and storage 
incentives, designed to attract capital and raw materials to the Tuscan economy, 
also made Livorno an ideal entrepot for redistributing goods throughout Italy 
24 Giuseppe Gino Guarnieri, Livorno medicea nel quadro delle sue atlrezzature por-
tuali e della funzione economica-maritlima (Livorno, 1970), doc. 5. 
25 Benjamin Ravid, "A Tale of Three Cities and Their Raison d'Etat: Ancona, Venice, 
Livorno, and the Competition for Jewish Merchants in the Sixteenth Century," Mediter-
ranean Historical Review 6 ( 1991 ): 13 8-62. 
26 Muslims did not come in large numbers, as it turned out. Protestants posed a more 
sustained challenge. Dissimulation among the Dutch and the English was high in the early 
decades of the seventeenth century as officials deliberately turned a blind eye to the spir-
itual affiliations of the city's inhabitants. Only when a religious matter threatened public 
order or relations with Rome did the regime intervene. Stefano Villani, "'Cum scandala 
catholicorum . . .' :La presenza a Livorno di predicatori protestanti inglesi trail 1644 e il 
1670," Nuovi studi livornesi 7 ( 1999): 9- 58. 
27 Elena Fasano Guarini, "Esenzioni e immigrazioni in citta tra sedicesimo e diciaset-
tesimo secolo," in Livorno e il Mediterraneo nell' eta medicea (Livorno, 1978), 56- 76, 
and Fasano Guarini, "La popolazione," in Livorno e Pisa: Due citta e un territorio nella 
politica dei Medici (Pisa, 1980), 199- 215. 
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and the Tyrrhenian region. Over time, it grew into a central node for trans-
Mediterranean commerce as well. Livomo 's transformation from a minor Tuscan 
port into "one of the most famous places for trade in all Christendom," as the 
pioneering mercantilist writer Thomas Mun put it in the late 1620s, ultimately 
owed to global economic developments.28 The crisis in Italian shipping, the 
production of cheaper textiles, and the growth of the Atlantic sphere created an 
opportunity for the major seafaring nations. Livomo was a perfect place for 
northerners to distribute their products as their markets in the Mediterranean 
expanded. 29 
Ferdinanda I took a vigorous interest in supervising the minutiae of the port's 
affairs. But after his death in 1609, the regime gradually scaled back its mari-
time ambitions and finally sold off most of the Tuscan galleys in 1647. In the 
meantime, privy secretaries more often enjoyed a free rein in managing admin-
istrative matters in Livomo, especially after Cosimo Il's premature demise in 
1620 ushered in fifteen years of government by regency. These developments 
strengthened the role of bureaucratic decision making- not because privy sec-
retaries could not exert central authority in any particular instance, but because 
ordinary administrative procedures made it costly for the central government to 
maintain constant vigilance as commerce expanded. In addition, the Medici 
regime lacked the theoretical and practical knowledge to direct their port proj-
ect. Late Renaissance economic thought opened up a vast new sphere for in-
tervention in commercial and industrial life, but it did not provide rulers with 
realistic assessments of how to adjust means to ends. 30 To move beyond a per-
spective focused on effective state action, then, it is necessary to pursue another 
trajectory to explain the elaboration of the free port: bottom-up bureaucratic 
processes. 
The framework set up in the late sixteenth century could scarcely accommo-
date the crush of new immigrants, merchandise, and industries. The Customs 
28 Thomas Mun, England's Treasure by Forraign Trade (Basingstoke, 1895), 24-25. 
Mun himself had spent the early years ofhis career in Livomo and had received a business 
loan from the grand duke. See Raymond De Roover, "Thomas Mun in Italy," Bulletin of 
the Institute of Historical Research 30, no. 81 ( 1957): 80-85. 
29 Femand Braude!, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age 
of Philip II (Berkeley, 1995); Braude!, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th- 18th Century 
(Berkeley, 1992); R. T. Rapp, "The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: 
International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution," Journal of Economic 
History 35 ( 1975): 499-525; Molly Greene, "Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Med-
iterranean in the Seventeenth Century," Past and Present 174, no. I (2002): 42-7 1. For a 
summary of the Italian literature, see Domenico Sella, Italy in the Seventeenth Century 
(London, 1997), 19-49; and Paolo Malanima, La fine del primato: Crisi e riconversione 
nell'Italia del Seicento (Milan, 1998). For Tuscany, see also Malanima, La decadenza di 
un'economia cittadina: L'industria di Firenze nei secoli XVI-XVJ1I (Bologna, 1982); 
Richard A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence (Baltimore, 2009). 
30 See n. 88 below. 
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Refonn of 1566 and the Livomina granted individuals general immunity from 
debts contracted outside the state (and before they settled in Livomo). Merchants 
also enjoyed the right to store goods in the port and to re-export them duty-free, so 
long as the goods did not change owners; and if goods were exchanged in 
Livomo, merchants paid reduced taxes depending on the commodity in ques-
tion and its origin. Most business disputes that arose from these arrangements 
were adjudicated on the basis of a combination of Roman law, local statutes and 
regulations, and customary norms. In this respect, Livomo was much like other 
commercial centers.31 Economic life in the free port also rested on a body of 
decrees, precedents, and practices that were bureaucratic in nature. Especially in 
the early decades ofLivomo's growth, the local bureaucracy had yet to settle into 
its standard procedures, and the extent of the city's liberties remained unknown. 
The requests of merchants generated piecemeal innovations that, taken together, 
contributed to the city's landscape of policies. Crucial steps toward consolidating 
a free-trade regime in Livomo included the decision to extend privileges to 
virtually all comers, not merely those who intended to settle in the port; to protect 
from seizure pirated goods purchased elsewhere and sold on the market in 
Livomo; to permit the free trade of both wholesale and retail goods despite the 
interests of local industry; and to extend warehousing rights indefinitely. 
After unearthing a number of supplication decrees that were not precisely to 
the point, Customs Director Attavanti ultimately grounded his defense of Se-
bastiana Ferro on the traditions of the free port. If officials with archives of laws 
and rescripts at their disposal made broad appeals to the free port, it should be no 
surprise that individual merchants did the same in their supplications. A good 
example occurred when two Ragusan ship captains contracted to carry raw wool 
from Spain to Livomo despite owing money to some Tuscan subjects. They 
undertook to transport it "seeing that the liberties of the Port of Livomo have 
been observed for other people notwithstanding the interests of Tuscan sub-
jects."32 As the ship drew close to Livomo, however, the Ragusans learned that 
their creditors intended to detain the ship to satisfy their debts. They requested 
31 In Livomo, the Governor's Court heard most cases initially, although ones involv-
ing more than two hundred lire were easily appealed. Two other mercantile courts heard 
cases originating in Livomo, the Sea Consuls in Pisa (Consoli del Mare), and the Mer-
chant's Tribunal in Florence (Mercanzia). These cases might end up at still another ap-
peals court in Florence, the Ruota Civile. Andrea Addobbati , "La giurisdizione marittima 
e comrnerciale dei Consoli del Mare in eta medicea," in Pisa e if Mediterraneo: Uomini, 
merci idee dagli Etruschi ai Medici, ed. M. Tangheroni (Milan, 2003 ); Trivellato, Famil-
iarity of Strangers, ch. I 0; Guillaume Calafat, "Expertises et tribunaux de commerce: 
Procedures et reputation a Livoume au xviie siecle," Hypotheses, no. I (20 I 0): 141 - 54; 
and in general: Francesco Galgano, Storia del diritto commerciale (Bologna, 1976), 29-
53; Charles Donahue, "The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria," in From Lex 
Mercatoria to Commercial Law, ed. Vito Piergiovanni (Berlin, 2005 ). 32 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. 2, f. 12, 10/06/1616. 
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a safe-conduct for trade to protect the privileges of the port from corrosion (as 
they put it) and to unload their cargo of wool. Even though the Ragusans ' request 
went against the letter of the city's privileges, which only protected people from 
their debts with alien subjects, the two were granted the exemptions ofLivorno. 
The dictates of law did not prompt the regime to grant such favors; on the 
contrary, they explicitly overrode the letter of the law. They were approved in 
order to increase the city's commerce and were known as agevolazioni or 
facilitazioni-little concessions that promoted commerce. 
Merchants or ship captains cited the free port precisely because it was difficult 
to track down every privilege, exemption, or license, much less the spirit behind 
the letter of these texts. Their concerns were usually grounded in concrete busi-
ness problems. For example, a basic question concerned the relationship be-
tween piracy and legitimate commerce. Two Corsicans, both citizens ofLivorno, 
were involved in buying pirated merchandise in Algiers and selling it in Li-
vorno. 33 In October 161 0 they supplicated to recover goods sequestered at the 
request of the original owner, who claimed that his property had been seized 
by enemy corsairs at sea and brought to Algiers for sale. The Corsicans were 
granted the assurance that "vessels and merchants from that part of Barbary may 
not be harassed" on the grounds that "Livorno is free and open for all business-
men."34 Though framed as a supplication for personal safe-conducts, this deci-
sion set a precedent that was incorporated into the customs of the free port. By 
this act the regime indicated that it would not discriminate against goods 
purchased in corsair warrens like Tunis or Algiers. The grand duke might have 
remanded this case to the lower courts, which would have disputed the matter 
according to the concept of postliminy.35 He did this when Christians claimed 
that his galleys had illegally seized their goods, as the direct sale of booty in 
Livorno was regulated according to strict legal principles.36 But instead he 
decreed that the liberties of the free port would protect merchants and the goods 
33 The two were Carlo Lorenzi and Rocco Manfredini. See Elisabetta Piccioni Lami, 
" ! Corsi a Livorno nel '600: Primo contributo," Studi livornesi 5 ( 1990): 71 - 79. 
34 ASF, Riformagioni, 28, f. 349, 06/ 19/1611. 
35 Postliminy (postliminium ) concerns the right by which property seized during war 
or piracy is restored to the original owners. Postliminy was under debate in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, particularly over goods captured by Barbary 
"pirates," traded legally in Barbary territory, and sold to a European merchant. The ten-
dency was for thinkers to legitimize such trade on pragmatic grounds. In Livorno it was 
legitimated on grounds of the free port. See Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Newport, 
Rl, 1988), 19-32; and Molly Greene, Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants: A Maritime 
History of the Mediterranean (Princeton, NJ, 20 I 0). 
36 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, ff. 456, 691 - 96; vol. 2, ff. 383- 84, 483, 515- 17. The 
claimants were usually Greek and their cases were sent to the Governor 's Court rather 
than resolved by supplication. 
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they purchased elsewhere, even in Barbary. 37 As late as 1645 the Corsicans' case 
was still cited along with thirty-four other memoranda important enough for the 
Customs Office to register in a specific book- a book which, however, officials 
seem not to have consulted very often.38 
The Reform of 1566 had granted merchants the right to store wares duty-free 
in Livomo for up to a year: the "liberal gift." As the city's commerce expanded, 
so too did the appetite for warehousing exemptions. During the reign of Ferdi-
nanda I, merchants won the right to keep their merci sottili (low-volume, high-
value goods) in their own warehouses rather than under Jock and key in the 
customs house, as stipulated by law.39 In 1627, several Livomo merchants sup-
plicated to extend the "liberal gift" to two years, subject to an annual customs 
inspection. Just a couple of years later they supplicated again to make the gift 
perpetual in exchange for an increase in stallage fees; the measure preserved 
customs revenues while simplifying procedures. Merchants could now store 
their goods in Livomo indefinitely without paying duties on their import or ex-
port, so long as the goods did not change ownership. The movement from "lib-
eral" to "perpetual" gift is an important marker of recognition of the city's role 
in the deposit and transit trade. It made warehousing exemptions central to the 
city's identity as a free port. The "perpetual gift" lasted only until the Reform of 
1643 reduced the warehousing exemption to two years, although the merchant 
nations soon won the right to request its biennial extension (so that they enjoyed 
the same privilege, albeit with more paperwork and bureaucratic oversight).40 
The supplications of merchant coalitions also shaped the relationship between 
industry and commerce in Livomo. In 1648, Carlo Antonio Pezzini supplicated 
for a privilege for the production and distribution of silk stockings. Forty-five 
merchants and shopkeepers sent a collective supplication begging the grand duke 
to deny Pezzini's privilege. Aside from the fact that the silk stocking industry 
would never amount to anything given the competition of established centers in 
Naples and Messina, they thought it would destroy the wholesale market for 
stockings in Livomo itself The customs director concurred with the merchants, 
remarking: "Given that this is a free port for all merchants alike, [conceding this 
privilege] would accomplish nothing but obscuring that title for something that 
37 Nor was this the only case of its kind. See ibid., vol. I, 03/12/ 1608; ASF, Miscel-
lanea Medicea (MM), 30, ins. 7, ff. 1- 15. 
38 ASL, CGA, 2603, 02/19/ 1644. Customs directors such as Attavanti or his long-
serving predecessor Ottavio Cappelli were notorious for governing the affairs of the port 
according to their whims. See, for instance, ASF, MP, 2150, ins. 3, 05/26/ 1640; and 
below, n. 80. 
39 Baruchello, Livorno e il suo porto, 278. 
40 Ibid., 277- 84, 291. A number of these supplications survive: e.g. , ASL, Dogana, 3, 
ff. 20, 24, 77, 78, 91 (all from 1648- 49). See ASF, MP, 2155,08/2 1/1643. 
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could not resu lt in any profit for the customs here.'><~ 1 The customs director argued 
that any privilege that hindered commerce in Livomo threatened its identity as a 
free port. In the end, Pezzini received only a privilege for the production of silk 
stockings. There were no prohibitions on sale or distribution. Yet again we see 
how Livomo's businessmen played a crucial role in defining the boundaries of the 
free port. 
Officials were well aware that the liberties of the free port were ill-defined. In 
1645, the auditore ofLivomo complained that there was no single repository of 
texts that defined procedures in the port. "But I have nothing else to say about the 
exemptions," he commented, "than to observe, that limitations have always been 
a seminary of disgust."42 This particular legal official was unhappy with gener-
ous interpretations of legislation. By contrast, the governor and customs direc-
tor were generally committed to a broad and evolving notion of a free port. They 
settled most matters on a case-by-case basis. Attavanti had based his arguments 
in defense of Sebastiana Ferro on decrees lifted directly from supplications.43 
These were identical in form to the requests of men like the Corsican traders, the 
Ragusan ship captains, and Carlo Antonio Pezzini. In the last analysis, Attavan-
ti's case rested less on decrees and more on what his predecessors in office had 
done. But many of their practices had originated in supplications, even if the de-
crees themselves seem to have been forgotten after the immediate decision. 
Supplications- and the ducal decrees that answered them- were crucial for 
defining, even creating, the free port. Precedents were confusing and not readily 
available. As a result, the free port remained a flexible concept that officials 
and merchants alike deployed strategically in their supplications. Over time this 
practice created a way of doing things in Livomo that constituted what con-
temporaries meant by a free port, namely, the protection of merchants, ship cap-
tains, and their wares from arbitrary government action and the right of traders 
of any nation or ethnicity to do business on equal terms. The Ferro episode and 
others in the mid-seventeenth century invented a tradition based on these prac-
tices. It helped create a body of authoritative texts of the free port whose cen-
terpiece was the Livomina. 
The preference for reactive, ad hoc policy making bequeathed a mass of prac-
tices that made free trade in Livomo an administrative labyrinth. The Medici 
regime became aware of this problem as it shifted its interest in Livomo from 
commercial and industrial goals to meeting the fiscal needs of the state. The 
outbreak of the War of Castro in 1641 and the ongoing demands for Tuscan sub-
sidies during the Thirty Years' War impelled Grand Duke Ferdinanda II to trim 
4 1 ASF, MP, 2324, ff. 201- 2 and 640. 
42 ASF, MP, 2160, f. 564, 02/ I ll 1644. 
43 Ibid. , f. 141 , 02/ 10/ 1644. He forwarded f. 142, a supplication from 1610; f. 143, a 
supplication from 1614; and f. 144, an undated safe-conduct. 
Managing Free Trade in Early Modern Europe 507 
the liberties of Livomo in his search for cash. His Reform of 1643 increased 
transit duties on most goods and shortened the warehousing exemption.44 This 
new law did not set out to foster bureaucratic simplicity, and Livomo's merchants 
continued to enjoy a favorable trade environment thanks to intimate ties with 
local officials (see below). Nevertheless, it shifted the focus of policy discussions 
from particular provisions or tax rates to the general administrative framework for 
trade. Rather than simply urging tax reductions, which would have been unwel-
come to the fiscally oriented grand duke, the foreign merchant communities 
began to object to the entire regime of particularistic liberties. They sought to 
extend the free port by simplifying administrative procedures on a systematic 
basis. It is no surprise that when a new reform finally arrived in 1676, it took the 
form of a fictive supplication whereby foreign consuls proposed a new tax re-
gime. In fact, the "supplication" was the product of intense negotiations be-
tween the merchant communities and top advisors to the young Grand Duke 
Cosimo III.4 5 
The Reform of 1676 eliminated ordinary taxes on imports while imposing an 
elevated but uniform stallage tax, the fee paid to house goods in Livomo. Mer-
chants paid the stallage fees only once. Thereafter, they could store, trade, or 
export goods without further payments or bureaucratic oversight. Contemporaries 
were duly impressed. The French traveler Jean-Baptiste Labat marveled in the 
early eighteenth century: 
Each parcel pays two piasters to enter, whether it contains silk or paper, whether it weighs 
one hundred pounds or fifteen hundred: it always pays the same duty. It is therefore a place 
of enormous parcels. Merchants take care to go aboard [ships] and to make one pack out of 
two, three, or four. They count them when passing through the Customs House without 
weighing them, without estimating how much they are worth, and without any of those 
annoying visits that one so often finds in other places. You know exactly what you have to 
pay, you pay it, and you ' re done.46 
For the Medici regime, the reform preserved the fiscal advantages of Livomo 
while regularizing the relationship between merchants and local officials: the 
44 ASF, Pratica Segreta (PS), 29, f. 705 . ln 1646 the government also imposed the 
Tenth (Decima ) on rental property, eliminating a long-cherished exemption that bene-
fited the Livomesi as well as foreign merchants. On the strategic situation faced by Fer-
dinando II, see Niccolo Capponi, "Le Palle di Marte: Mi litary Strategy and Diplomacy in 
the Grand Duchy of Tuscany under Ferdinand II de' Medici ( 1621- 1670)," Journal of 
Military History 68, no. 4 (2004) : II 05- 41. 
45 Ferdinando II promised the foreign merchants of Livomo that his regime would 
consider simplifying tax procedures as early as 1660 (Giacchero, Storia economica, 30). 
The eventual "supplication" may be found in ASF, MP, 2272, 03/10/1676. See Frattarelli 
Fischer, "Livomo 1676." 
46 Labat, Voyages, 2:87. 
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grand duke did not like the capricious way officials appeared to reign over the 
institutional jungle of the free port. For merchants it amounted to a substantial 
reduction in transaction costs. The Reform of 1676 crystallized the notion that 
a true free port could charge only for commercial services such as warehousing 
or harbor use, not import duties. But it was motivated largely by an appreciation 
of the practical benefits of administrative simplicity in a city where free trade 
had developed with little central planning, poor theoretical guidance, and collu-
sive relations between merchants and local officials. 
II. SUPPLICATIONS AND THE COMMERCIAL CLASSES 
Like monarchical power elsewhere in Europe, Medici rule rested on a process 
of bargaining between centers and peripheries. The grand duke respected the 
traditional privileges of his territory's governing bodies while overlaying them 
with supervisors that enabled him to intervene in the judicial process, balance 
local interests, and control finances throughout the state. In many ways, these 
policies were a continuation of those that developed under the Republic. What 
changed was the introduction of a Medici court apparatus and the bureaucrati-
zation of governance in the form of a larger administration staffed by permanent 
officers.47 Supplications are a case in point. In the fifteenth century, rural com-
munities presented their petitions to the Florentine government in person via 
oratores. In the mid-sixteenth century, Cosima I began personally handling writ-
ten supplications to provide equity to his subjects. After a few decades of princely 
intervention, the growing Tuscan bureaucracy replaced the direct attention of the 
47 Elena Fasano Guarini, La stato mediceo di Cosima I (Florence, 1973); Fasano 
Guarini, "Center and Periphery," in The Origins of the State in Italy, 1300-1600, ed. Julius 
Kirshner (Chicago, 1996), 74-96; Fasano Guarini, L'Italia moderna e Ia Toscana dei 
principi (Milan, 2008); Giorgio Spini, ed., Architettura e politica da Cosima I a Ferdi-
nanda I (Florence, 1976); R. Burr Litchfield, Emergence of a Bureaucracy: The Florentine 
Patricians, 1530-1790 (Princeton, NJ, 1986); Luca Mannori, II sovrano tulare: Pluralismo 
istituzionale e accentramento amministrativo nel principato dei Medici (secc. XVI-XVIII) 
(Milan, 1994); Jean-Claude Waquet, Le grand-duche de Toscane sous les derniers Med-
icis: Essai sur le systeme de finances et Ia stabilite des institutions dans les anciens etats 
italiens (Rome, 1990); William J. Connell and Andrea Zorzi, eds., Florentine Tuscany: 
Structures and Practices of Power (Cambridge, 2000). For other Italian states, see esp. 
Giorgio Chittolini, Laformazione della stato region alee le istituzioni del contado (Turin, 
1979), and Chittol ini, "The 'Private,' the 'Public,' the State," in The Origins of the State 
in Italy, 34-{)1. For France, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-
Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge, 
1985), and Beik, "The Absolutism of Louis XTV as Social Collaboration," Past and 
Present 188, no. 1 (2005): 195- 224; for England, Michael Braddick, The Nerves of State: 
Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714 (Manchester, 1996), and 
Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550- 1700 (Cambridge, 2000); 
and in general, J. H. Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," Past and Present 137 
(1992): 48-71. 
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monarch with a system of rules, precedents, and more or less formalized prac-
tices.48 Local officials often controlled the pace and, in practice, the outcome of 
the supplication process. And while many of the dispensations the regime granted 
lay squarely in the criminal, political, and military spheres, others had commer-
cial, fiscal , or industrial implications. The supplication was an important con-
duit for introducing novel procedures or clarifying older regulations. In Livomo, 
this form of state intervention tended to extend rather than limit freedom of trade. 
The supplication process was a key dynamic that ordered relations between 
center and periphery in Tuscan political life. Historians have focused on the me-
diation of local officials as they bargained or negotiated interests between the lo-
calities, which were intent on preserving their autonomies, and the grand duke, 
who was concerned with securing obedience and with fiscal matters. By contrast, 
scholars inspired by neoinstitutional economics have concentrated on political 
bargaining at the center when they investigate early modem politics.49 They have 
largely ignored administration in their examination of relations between mon-
archs and elites. 5° Studying the working conditions oflocal institutions helps his-
torians incorporate information flows and bottlenecks into our understanding of 
systems of territorial power in the ancien regime. Although officials did indeed 
"mediate" and "negotiate," their capacity to do so was determined not by their 
position relative to the center or periphery but by their ability to manage and 
overcome the informational difficulties inherent in administering Livomo. Even 
when documentary precedents existed, neither ducal secretaries nor local officials 
found it easy to retrieve information from their archives (or from reality, for that 
matter). When making decisions, officials often had no sensible choice but to rely 
on individuals who had a stake in the outcome. The passive nature of the system, 
48 Samuel Cohn Jr., Creating the Florentine State: Peasants and Rebellion, 1348-
1434 (Cambridge, 1999); James Shaw, "Writing to the Prince: Supplications, Equity, and 
Absolutism in Sixteenth-Century Tuscany," Past and Present 215, no. 1 (2012): 51 -83 . 
49 For example, Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commit-
ment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century En-
gland," Journal of Economic History 49 ( 1989): 803-32; Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "The 
Political Economy of Absolutism Reconsidered," in Analytic Narratives, ed. Robert H. 
Bates et al. (Princeton, NJ, 1998), 64-1 08; Regina Grafe and Oscar Gelderblom, "The 
Rise and Fall of Merchant Guilds: Re-thinking the Comparative Study of Commercial 
Institutions in Premodern Europe," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40, no. 4 (20 I 0): 
477- 511. For neo-institutional economic theory as applied to historical research, see Avner 
Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade 
(Cambridge, 2006). 
50 Exceptions are Edgar Kiser, "Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Sys-
tems: A Principal-Agent Analysis," Politics and Society 22, no. 3 ( 1994): 284- 3 15 (and 
the criticism by Matthew Vester, "The Political Autonomy of a Tax Farm: The Nice-
Piedmont Gabelle of the Dukes of Savoy, 1535- 1580," Journal of Modern History 76 
[2004]: 745- 92); and Regina Grafe, Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness 
in Spain, 1650-1800 (Princeton, NJ, 2012). 
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in which suppliants took the initiative in framing requests, further diminished the 
government's role in directing ordinary business. These factors stacked the cards 
in favor ofLivomo's merchants, artisans, and ship captains. 
Princely regimes in sixteenth-century Italy found supplications a potent vehi-
cle for affirming their status as absolute rulers and exercising munificence. An 
integral element of European political theology, the practice of supplications orig-
inated in a judicial context and was used to overturn decisions. 5 1 Whereas ap-
peals were founded on strict procedural justice and ius commune, the supplication 
was founded solely on grace. In the sixteenth century the practice evolved to al-
low intervention in other realms as supplications were used to request patronage, 
propose commercial or industrial monopolies, and raise complaints. A burgeon-
ing contemporary literature urged princes to be generous in bestowing their fa-
vors on subordinates. Baldassare Castiglione praised princes who were "liberal" 
in dispensing graces on their subjects. 52 For once, the virtuous counsel of hu-
manists served the interests of princes. Supplications enabled rulers to superim-
pose their power over courts and communal governments while satisfying the 
demands of their subjects, especially the poor and weak. 
Supplications were sometimes heard in voce, but the practice as a whole was 
a written substitution for holding an audience.53 Virtually every bureaucracy in 
Tuscany had a collection of supplications, which run into the thousands of vol-
umes. Other regimes also established regular channels to cope with the sheer 
51 Although the supplication has deep roots in the ancient world, the practice only 
(re)assurned bureaucratic dimensions in the papal chancery of the fourteenth century. It 
then spread to other Italian courts where it enabled upstart dyna ties such as the Scaliger of 
Verona or the Pepoli in Bologna to gain authority over communal institutions. Franco 
Bartolini, "Suppliche pontificie nei secoli XIII e XIV," Bullettino dell'fstituto storico 
italiano peril medio evo 67 (1955) ; Paola Repetti, "Scrivere ai potenti: Suppliche e me-
moriah a Parma (secoli XVI- XVIII). Lo stato, Ia giustizia, Ia supplica," Scrittura e civiltd 
24 (2000): 295-358; Cecilia Nubola and Andreas Wiirgler, eds., Suppliche e "grava-
mina": Politica, amministrazione, giustizia in Europa (secoli XIV-XVlll) (Bologna, 
2002); Nubola and Wiirgler, eds., Forme della comunicazione politica in Europa nei secoli 
XV-XVlll: Suppliche, gravamina, lettere (Bologna, 2004); and Nubola and Wiirgler, eds., 
Operare Ia resistenza: Suppliche, gravamina e rivolte in Europa (secoli XV-XVIII) (Bo-
logna, 2006); Massimo Vallerani, "La supplica al signore e il potere della misericordia: 
Bologna 1337- 1347," Quaderni storici 44 (2009). For the supplication in antiquity, see 
Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (3 1 BC-A D 337) (London, 1977), 537-
49; Benjamin Kelly, Petitions, Litigation, and Social Control in Roman Egypt (Oxford, 
2011). 
52 Baldassare Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, trans. George Bull (New York, 
2003),296,308, 310. 
53 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, 04/20/ 1609; ibid. , vol. 2, f. 21 , 06/03/ 1597. See Gian 
Maria Varanini, '"AI magnifico e possente segnoro ': Suppliche ai signori trecenteschi 
italiani fra cancelleria e corte. L'esempio scaligero," in Suppliche e "gravamina, " 65-
106,87. 
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number ofrequests .54 The supplications exploited in this study were composed in 
the third person and generally did not bear a signature, date, or place of compo-
sition. They were probably drafted by a notary or scrivener who copied from a 
formulary. From there, the supplicant found an official or ally who transmitted his 
request to the ducal chancellery. The documents usually contain the name of the 
supplicant, his town of origin or residence, the nature of his request, and a brief 
summary of the facts .55 Thanks to their abundance and formal characteristics, 
supplications are ripe for quantitative analysis. Unfortunately, these same generic 
conventions make it difficult to get at the realities they purport to represent. For-
mulaic language is used both in the relation of facts and in the request for grace. 
In addition, even detailed supplications contain the fictive elements common to 
legal cases.56 Accordingly, most scholars have shied away from a quantitative 
study and focused instead on supplications as a rhetorical form of communication 
between subjects and sovereigns. They were vehicles for conveying grievances 
and demanding redress.57 In Livomo, however, the official investigation (infor-
mazione) also exists alongside supplications and offers a further means for con-
textualizing requests. When read in light of other evidence, a quantitative study 
provides insight into decision making in Livomo as well as a window upon social 
and political realities. 
54 For instance, the Archivio Segreto Vaticano lists 7,365 volumes in its Registra 
supplicationum. The French collection knowns as the Tn\sor des Chartes in the Archives 
Nationales contains some 9,500 letters of remission for the years 1523- 68. Philip II 
answered no fewer than thirty to forty supplications per day. Cecilia Nubola, "La 'via 
supplicationis' negli stati italiani della prima eta modema (secoli XV- XV1ll)," in Sup-
pliche e "gra vamina," 35; Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales 
and Their Tellers in Seventeenth-Century France (Stanford, CA, 1987), 145; Geoffrey Par-
ker, The Grand Strategy of Philip If (New Haven, CT, 1998), 28. Not all supplications 
were routed through the bureaucracies, however, as many found their way into the letters 
of prominent officials and courtiers. Irene Fosi , "Rituali della parol a: Supplicare, raccoman-
dare e raccomandarsi aRoma nel Seicento," in Forme della comunicazione politica, 329-
49; Simon Teuscher, "Chains of Favor: Approaching the City Council in Late Medieval 
Bern," in ibid. , 311 - 28; Karia Pischedda, "Supplicare, intercedere, raccomandare: Forme e 
significati del chiedere nella corrispondenza di Cristoforo Madruzzo ( 1539- 1567)," in 
ibid., 351 - 82. 
55 Amedeo Quondam, "Dal 'formulario' a! 'fomlUlario': Cento anni di 'libri di let-
tere,'" in Le "carte messaggiere ": Retorica e modelli di comunicazione epistolare. Per un 
indice dei libri di !etten! del Cinquecento, ed. Amedeo Quondam (Rome, 1981 ), 130; 
Gianni Orlandi, "Suppliche al Comune di Ancona (sec. XVI): lnventario," Quademi della 
rassegna degli archivi di stato 97 (2001 ) : 16- 22; Repetti , "Scrivere ai potenti," 30 1- 13; 
Cristina Belloni, Suppliche al pontejice: Diocesi di Trento 1566-1605 (Bologna, 2007). 
56 Davis argues that requests for pardon can be analyzed as a genre of storytelling. 
Davis, Fiction in the Archives. 
57 Paola Repetti does perform a quantitative analysis, although she lacks the rescripts 
and the informazioni on which I draw. Repetti , "Scrivere ai potenti," 295-96, 312. 
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24 (2000): 295-358; Cecilia Nubola and Andreas Wiirgler, eds., Suppliche e "grava-
mina": Politica, amministrazione, giustizia in Europa (secoli XIV-XVlll) (Bologna, 
2002); Nubola and Wiirgler, eds., Forme della comunicazione politica in Europa nei secoli 
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For this study I examined 772 surviving supplications from the two chief bu-
reaucracies in Livorno: the Customs Office (n = 173) and the Governor's Of-
fice (n = 599) . Their officials reported directly and almost daily to a privy sec-
retary on a variety of requests pertaining to econorrtic life. My source selections 
were conditioned by the surviving material and, where material was abundant, 
the beginning and end of reigns; the figure for the Customs Office is so low be-
cause many of the documents in its archive were destroyed in the late nineteenth 
century. 58 I coded every supplication into one of twelve exclusive categories: 
privilege, exemption, license, safe-conduct against specific debtors, general safe-
conduct to trade in the port, contract enforcement, fine or assessment revision, 
grant (requests for jobs, pay raises, etc. ), abuse report, judicial, administrative, 
and miscellaneous. I use the term "economic graces" to describe the first seven 
categories because they directly shaped commercial and industrial life in the 
port. 59 Of course, other graces rrtight have had econorrtic consequences (such as 
the court cases of merchants), but they were <lisposed of according to a judicial or 
political logic. 
58 The documents come from: ASL, CGA, 2602: 1592-1629 (n = 408); ASL, CGA, 
2603: 1640- 48 (n = 148); ASL, CGA, 2608; 1680-82 (n = 43 ); ASL, Dogana, 3: 1648-
53 (n = 173). While we have no reason to believe that the run of documents is com-
plete, particularly for the earliest periods, supplications were conserved because of their 
importance to the chancery in establishing precedents. If we cannot be sure of having 
access to all of the supplications of a given period, at least we can be confident about the 
relative importance of those that do survive. I read only three years of the Governor's 
Office records from the 1680s because it was evident that supplications dealt almost en-
tirely with housing and judicial matters. Note that the customs records between 1648 and 
1653 seem relatively complete. 
59 Privileges were requests to be the exclusive producer, distributor, or tax farmer of a 
good. Exemptions were requests to avoid paying a tax, to receive a lower tax rate, or to get 
permission to engage in some form of economic activity without paying a tax. Licenses 
included permission to engage in economic activity while nonetheless paying the usual 
taxes (e.g., privateering patents). Specific safe-conducts protected individuals from pros-
ecution by a specific list of creditors. Bankrupt merchants usually requested such safe-
conducts to ensure orderly repayments to creditors or to protect themselves from malicious 
creditors. The general safe-conduct protected individuals from any civil debts contracted 
outside Tuscany or with non-Tuscan subjects. They were the equivalent of " taking the 
exemptions" of Livomo and were sometimes requested by potential immigrants, often 
redundantly. Contract enforcement supplications were requests for the government to 
enforce a contract, compel payment, or settle a debt. These were often efforts to circumvent 
the ordinary course of justice, as normally the governor or the Sea Consuls in Pi sa would 
hav.e .heard such cases. (I also placed requests for enforcement of judicial decisions in the 
JUdtctal category.) Assessment revisions were requests to have an assessment or fine 
reduced or an extension on payment. The majority of these requests were supplications 
to the .customs Office asking for an extension on tax dues or (for smugglers) a penalty 
reductiOn. 
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Supplications in Livorno largely served the commercial classes. Individuals 
making requests came mostly from the mercantile ( 4 7 percent) and artisanal 
(17 percent) sectors (table 2). Only 10 percent came from occupations a~soci­
ated with maritime life-ship captains or owners, petty boat operators, manners, 
and the like. Few of the city's teeming poor supplicated. The presence of 
laborers and small-time mariners is modest compared to the richer, much less 
numerous mercantile sector. Perhaps the supplications of the poor were less 
likely to survive or less likely to record their occupations than those of higher 
status.60 At any rate, it is clear that the commercial classes found it possible to 
adapt the system of supplications to their needs. About 45 percent of the cases 
handled by the Governor's Office, and nearly 80 percent of the cases handled by 
the Customs Office, dealt with the economy (table 3). Remaining business 
largely pertained to judicial or housing matters.61 Although both offices dealt 
with requests for privileges, exemptions, licenses, and safe-conducts, the polic-
ing of economic life lay in the hands of the governor. It was his office that en-
forced contracts, handled requests for safe-conducts, and managed court cases. 
Only in cases of penalty revisions did the two offices share the burdens of po-
licing, since both bodies could levy fines under certain con<litions.62 A practice 
originally instituted for facilitating justice and empowering the poor became, in 
Livorno, a tool for manipulating economic life. 
The regime had a marked preference for granting supplications. Out of 639 
supplications with known resolutions, the regime granted 67 percent (table 4).63 
At a basic level, the desire among European rulers to exercise their generosity 
explains this finding: Natalie Zemon Davis found that over 93 percent of pardon-
seekers at the Paris Conciergerie between 1564 and 1580 won the king's grace 
60 A word of caution is in order. The monikers mercante, negotiante, and so forth found 
in the supplications were not direct expressions of social reality. No doubt many who did 
business in Livomo arrogated the title of mercante without recognition by their "peers." 
Nor do the words distinguish between the big wholesale merchants and smaller-scale 
operators. But thanks to the process of investigation described in the text, supplicants had 
to make their designations plausible or risk being exposed as frauds. 
61 By contrast, I have found little evidence that supplications were a primary vehicle 
for managing the port's religious life. There are a few examples, e.g., ASL, CGA, 2602 , 
vol. 2, f. 249. But in general , urgent religious issues could scarcely be decided by means 
of supplications because of the potential involvement of the Holy Office. See the Saint-
hill episode in Villani, "Cum scandala catholicorum," 9- 13. 
62 See Marcella Aglietti, I governatori di Livorno dai Medici all' Unita d' ltalia: Gli 
uomini, le istituzioni, Ia citta (Pisa, 2009). 
63 The figures break down to an acceptance rate of 85 percent for the Customs Office 
and 61 percent for the Governor 's Office. The lower proportion for the Governor 's Office 
is accounted for by instances in which the grand duke remanded a supplication to the 
governor's own court. At that point they become ordinary judicial cases. 
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TABLE 2 
SuPPLICANTS BY OccuPATIONAL STATUS, 1592- 1682 
Customs Office Governor's Office 
Occupational Status (1648- 53 ) ( 1592- 1682) Total Percentage 
Noble 2 16 18 2 
Businessman 58 299 357 47 
Professional 4 15 19 2 
Shipowner/captain 3 33 36 5 Official 28 18 46 6 
Petty shipowner/mariner 6 29 35 5 Artisan/shopkeeper 19 109 128 17 Laborer I 14 15 2 Military 7 20 27 4 Clergy 10 39 49 6 City of Livomo 0 28 28 4 Jewish community I 3 4 I Miscellaneous community 0 2 2 0 
Total 139 625 764 100 
SouRcE.- See n. 58. 
NOTE.- Businessmen include mercanti, negotianti, and sensali/mezzani. Shipowners or captains include 
those who described their vessels as navi. Those who used terms for small craft such as fewi were classified as 
petty shipowners or mariners. Artisans or shopkeepers were those who described themselves as practicing a 
craft, maintaining a bouega , or engaged in the retail trade. Professionals were typically doctors or lawyers. 
for homicide.64 But other processes also account for the high acceptance rate. 
First, supplications were drafted in a stereotypical manner that reflected the con-
ventions of the genre and the known preferences of the regime. The merchants 
of Livomo were well aware of the grand duke 's standards for granting safe-
conduct from debt, for instance. Second, there is abundant evidence for "pre-
selection" whereby individuals lobbied with local officials before submitting 
their requests. The high approval rate marks the success of officials in mediating 
affairs in the port by vetting requests, lobbying for measures they liked, and 
blocking proposals they disliked. It does not represent the efforts of merchants 
and artisans in Livomo to overstep the authority of loca l officials by appealing to 
the central governrnent. In most cases the grand duke and his secretaries had no 
knowledge of a matter until a supplication brought it to their attention. It was 
then delegated back to Livomo for investigation. Although supplications were 




Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 52. Davis focused on supplications for capital 
cnmes, whtch had dtstmct procedures that differed substantially from practices in Li-
vomo: Most Important, the French courts conducted their ratification process according 
to JUdtcta1 norms (tfnot procedures) , whereas the investigations I studied in Livomo were 
conducted by bureaucrats according to the nom1s of their offices. fbid ., 8- 11 . 
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TABLE 3 
SuPPLICATIONS BY TYPE 
Governor's Office Customs Office 
( 1592- 1682) (1648-53) Total Percentage 
Privi lege 27 9 36 5 
Exemption 22 44 66 9 
License 42 30 72 9 
Specific safe-conduct 54 7 61 8 
General safe-conduct 18 0 18 2 
Contract enforcement 57 I 58 8 
Asse sment revision 43 41 84 II 
Grant 56 30 86 II 
Abuse report 12 3 15 2 
Judicial 156 I 157 20 
Administrative 62 4 66 9 
Miscellaneous 46 3 49 6 
Total 595 173 768 100 
SouRCE.-See n. 58. 
Gentlemen, merchants, and artisans were effective at arranging their graces 
and privileges before the formal submission of a supplication. This "preselec-
tion" helps explain the high rate of approval I have observed. When the English 
refugee Sir Robert Dudley wanted a privilege for his new method of dyeing silk, 
he wrote to the governor of Livomo to settle his supplication ahead of time.65 
Another official discussed the safe-conduct of a gentleman from Padua with a 
privy secretary before drafting the supplication.66 The preselection process was 
part and parcel with the traffic in personal recommendations, and it was common 
for officials to use a form of the word "recommend" when forwarding a sup-
plication.67 As a result, they were reluctant even to accept supplications of which 
they disapproved, or which they did not find convenient for the grand duke. The 
assistant director of customs wrote to one secretary, "I've done my best not to 
trouble Your Lordship about the Netherlander who is owed money by those old 
butchers, but he has been so insistent that I could not escape forwarding his 
memorial."68 Failed supplications did not generate a large body of rejections 
because many died in tran it or got lost in the bureaucratic shuffle. 
Supplications in Livomo often became public knowledge. There was no pre-
tense of secrecy, partly because supplicants handed their requests directly to 
65 ASF, MP, 1305, f. 51,07/03/ 1610 and 07/ 10/ 1610. 
66 ASF, MP, 2140, f. 27, 01 /26/ 1606. For other examples see ibid., ff. 286, 830, 853. 67 Ibid., ff. 133, 142; f. 847 (in which the official denies his " recommendation"); ASF, 
MP, 2139, ff. 346, 353, 463 . See Fosi , "Rituali della parola." 
68 ASF, MP, 2139, f. 470, 12/ 17/ 1605. 
514 Tazzara 
TABLE 2 
SuPPLICANTS BY OccuPATIONAL STATUS, 1592- 1682 
Customs Office Governor's Office 
Occupational Status (1648- 53 ) ( 1592- 1682) Total Percentage 
Noble 2 16 18 2 
Businessman 58 299 357 47 
Professional 4 15 19 2 
Shipowner/captain 3 33 36 5 Official 28 18 46 6 
Petty shipowner/mariner 6 29 35 5 Artisan/shopkeeper 19 109 128 17 Laborer I 14 15 2 Military 7 20 27 4 Clergy 10 39 49 6 City of Livomo 0 28 28 4 Jewish community I 3 4 I Miscellaneous community 0 2 2 0 
Total 139 625 764 100 
SouRcE.- See n. 58. 
NOTE.- Businessmen include mercanti, negotianti, and sensali/mezzani. Shipowners or captains include 
those who described their vessels as navi. Those who used terms for small craft such as fewi were classified as 
petty shipowners or mariners. Artisans or shopkeepers were those who described themselves as practicing a 
craft, maintaining a bouega , or engaged in the retail trade. Professionals were typically doctors or lawyers. 
for homicide.64 But other processes also account for the high acceptance rate. 
First, supplications were drafted in a stereotypical manner that reflected the con-
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Davis, Fiction in the Archives, 52. Davis focused on supplications for capital 
cnmes, whtch had dtstmct procedures that differed substantially from practices in Li-
vomo: Most Important, the French courts conducted their ratification process according 
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TABLE 3 
SuPPLICATIONS BY TYPE 
Governor's Office Customs Office 
( 1592- 1682) (1648-53) Total Percentage 
Privi lege 27 9 36 5 
Exemption 22 44 66 9 
License 42 30 72 9 
Specific safe-conduct 54 7 61 8 
General safe-conduct 18 0 18 2 
Contract enforcement 57 I 58 8 
Asse sment revision 43 41 84 II 
Grant 56 30 86 II 
Abuse report 12 3 15 2 
Judicial 156 I 157 20 
Administrative 62 4 66 9 
Miscellaneous 46 3 49 6 
Total 595 173 768 100 
SouRCE.-See n. 58. 
Gentlemen, merchants, and artisans were effective at arranging their graces 
and privileges before the formal submission of a supplication. This "preselec-
tion" helps explain the high rate of approval I have observed. When the English 
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trouble Your Lordship about the Netherlander who is owed money by those old 
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tense of secrecy, partly because supplicants handed their requests directly to 
65 ASF, MP, 1305, f. 51,07/03/ 1610 and 07/ 10/ 1610. 
66 ASF, MP, 2140, f. 27, 01 /26/ 1606. For other examples see ibid., ff. 286, 830, 853. 67 Ibid., ff. 133, 142; f. 847 (in which the official denies his " recommendation"); ASF, 
MP, 2139, ff. 346, 353, 463 . See Fosi , "Rituali della parola." 
68 ASF, MP, 2139, f. 470, 12/ 17/ 1605. 
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TABLE 4 
AccEPTANCE RATES, 1592- 1682 
Governor's Office Customs Office Total 
Accepted Total Accepted 
Acceptance Rates 
Total (%) 
Privilege 10 23 3 7 43 Exemption 12 19 33 42 74 License 30 37 27 28 88 Specific safe-conduct 38 48 7 7 82 General safe-conduct 15 17 0 0 88 Contract enforcement II 46 I I 26 
Assessment revision 28 36 34 40 82 Grant 24 40 26 29 72 Abuse report 4 II I 3 36 Judicial 53 108 I I 50 Administrative 43 52 4 4 84 Miscellaneous 20 37 3 3 58 
Total 288 474 140 165 67 
SouRCE. See n. 58. 
the governor, the customs director, or one of their underlings to transmit back to 
Florence.69 These men read and discussed supplications before sending them 
~long. But the practice of information gathering after submission of a supplica-
tion was public i.n a.more direct sense. If the grand duke asked the governor to 
evaluate a su~phcatiOn, ~e governor sent one of his lackeys through the mar-
ketp~ace Iookmg for the mt~rested parties. For instance, when the commissary 
of L1vorno needed to compile a report on the alabaster industry, he sent a man 
to talk w~th the privilege-holder Innocentio Nerucci. Nerucci's shop was always 
shu.t ~p ,~1ght,. and eventually the commissary himself decided to pay the artisan 
a VISit: Passmg by I asked a mason who was working there where the master 
of the w~r~shop was, and he told me that he had gone to the fairs. Apparently 
InnocentJo IS the type of man who works only when he has to. "70 Livomo was 
small. Most business took place in the Piazza Grande, in the government offices 
that flanked the piazza, or in the nearby dockyards. In addition, officials were not 
the only people flitting to and fro asking questions. The city's scores of brokers 
who. negotiated sales between wholesale merchants were also conduits of news. 
In LI~or~o, there were few barriers to the rapid circulation of information about 
supplicatiOns or commerce more generally. 
69 ASF, MP, 2 140, ff. 147, 152- 53, 211, 407, 647. 
70 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, f. 328. 
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The information-gathering process and the publicity it generated minimized 
the tendency for supplicants to make patently false claims in their requests. A 
few did not resist the temptation to lie, however. The debtor Michele Tilche as-
serted that most of his creditors supported his supplication for safe conduct, 
but his request was denied after officials di covered during investigation that 
Tilche had larded his petition with the names ofnoncreditors. 71 This example is 
significant because safe-conducts were routine business in Livorno, and it shows 
that even simple supplications received a measure of direct examination. Re-
quests for privileges, licenses, and exemptions triggered more thorough inves-
tigations. I have found few instances in which officials reported outright lying in 
supplications. Of course, successful liars would be impossible to detect. But the 
practices of information gathering made lying difficult. 
Although it is impossible to estimate how many supplications were stage-
managed, it appears that prescreening in Livorno was less effective in conflict-
prone situations. Requests for privileges, contract enforcement, and judicial 
interventions were denied more often than other kinds of supplications- accep-
tance rates were only 43 percent, 26 percent, and 50 percent, respectively. 72 In 
these cases, conflicts of interest were likely to prove problematic because they 
involved other parties. Exemptions and licenses could be granted to one indi-
vidual without affecting others (except indirectly). By contrast, exclusive privi-
lege antagonized people who were already producing or dealing in a good. For 
instance, Giulio Romano's proposal to create a privilege for weighing the grains 
used by the Cathedral Workshop (Opera del Duomo) was denied on the grounds 
that the Customs Office 's corporate stevedores already enjoyed that right by 
custom. In cases of contract enforcement, the regime strongly preferred the ju-
dicial process over direct intervention. Even when a baker asked for a mutual 
friend to adjudicate over payment from a merchant who was supposed to invest 
in his shop, the grand duke preferred to follow the ordinary course ofjustice.73 
These norms of equity were a function of the judicial legacy of the supplicatory 
process. According to one French jurist, established interests were ipso facto 
legitimate and could not be infringed upon in adjudicating supplications. This 
principle lay behind the process of investigation and consultation conducted by 
public officials.74 
7 1 ASL, CGA, 2603, vol. 2, ff. 950-51 . 
72 See table 2. Abuse reports also had a low acceptance rate (36 percent), but the small 
number of cases (only 14) makes it difficult to draw conclusions. The low acceptance rate 
of judicial supplications found in the Governor's Office ( 49 percent) is partly compen-
sated by the 24 percent of cases remanded to the governor's own court by the grand duke. 
73 ASL, CGA, 2602, vol. I, f. 345. 
74 Petrus Rebuffus, "Tractatus de supplicationibus, seu errorum propositionibus," in 
Commentaria in constitutiones (Lugduni , 1599), 30 I; Christian Zendri, "II 'Tractatus de 
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Taken as a whole, the supplications suggest that a creative period in Livomo's 
?olitica_l economy came to an end by the 1640s. Sufficient sources for compar-
Ison exist only for the Governor's Office (table 5). In earlier decades, the gov-
ernor dealt with a great variety of supplications. The uncertainties posed by im-
migration, new commerce and industries, and rampant piracy all required his 
attention.75 The practices associated with the free port also became increasingly 
regular thanks to the institution of supplications. Informal traditions based on 
older decisions obviated the need for innovative economic supplications. As a 
result, more of the governor's business was occupied with judicial matters or 
safe-conducts against creditors. Supplications were more often remanded to his 
court rather than decided by the grand duke. The simpler profile of requests by 
the 1640s reflects the changed needs of Livorno as the free port became an 
institutional reality. In its early days, the system of supplications revolved less 
around judicial affairs than around economic matters. But the Customs Office 
and the Governor's Office gradually amassed a body of practical knowledge, 
documented precedents, and assumptions about the port that facilitated free 
trade in Livorno. By the 1640s- the period when Attavanti declared that "the 
custom is that ev~n our enemies the Turks have enjoyed and continue to enjoy 
the freedom of thts port"- the system of supplications was routine rather than 
innovative. 
The supplication system allowed the grand duke to intervene when he wished 
w~ile_allo~in~ for the general reign of customs and consensus. My study of sup-
plicatiOns mdicates, however, that in virtually every instance the regime fol-
low_ed the recommendation oflocal officials. This was true for both complicated 
busmess and mundane matters, for which the grand duke or his secretary sim-
ply wrote non altro ("not otherwise") or cosi sifa ("do it this way") at the end 
of the official commentary. 76 It goes without saying that these local officials 
were not disinterested analysts of commerce, committed ideologically to norms 
of free trade. Except for the auditore of Livorno, a virtually all of the port's top 
supplicationi_bus~ seu errorurn propositionibus ' di Pierre Rebuffi ( 1487-1557)," in Forme 
della comu~1cazwne poilt1ca, 35- 51. The juridical nature of what today we would call an 
adrnmts?"attve body was typical of ancien regime approaches to governance. See Luca 
M~on and Bernardo ~ordi , Storia del diritto amministrativo (Rome-Bari, 2001). 
The arc oflegtslatiOn confirms thts chronology. Ferdinanda I and Cosimo II issued a 
we~ter of laws and decrees for regulating the minutiae of economic life in Livomo. This 
legtslahon was often a response to uncertainties in the current framework rather than a 
novel policy departure. Lorenzo Cantini, Legislazione Toscana raccolta ed illustrata 
32 vols. (Flo~~ce, 1800-1808), esp. vols. 12- 15; and Giuseppe Vivoli, Annali di Livorno; 
Dalla sua ongme sino all' an nodi Gesu Cristo 1840, 4 vols. (Livomo 1974 [ 1 840]) esp 
vols.2and3. ' '· 
76 Sometimes a dissatisfied privy secretary asked for further information (e.g., ASL, 
CGA, 2602, vol. 2, 06/14/1619), but such cases were infrequent. 
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TABLE 5 
SuPPLICATIONS TO THE GovERNOR's OFFicE BY TYPE 
1592- 1608 1609- 20 1621-30 1640-48 1680-82 
Category (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Privilege 4 8 5 3 2 
Exemption 7 4 2 3 2 
License 13 9 5 2 7 
Specific safe-conduct 8 7 10 II 9 
General safe-conduct 4 5 3 I 0 
Contract enforcement 6 12 6 I 3 14 
Assessment revision 14 7 2 7 0 
Grant 12 II 10 7 0 
Abuse report I 3 3 2 0 
Judicial 8 15 26 44 60 
Administrative II 16 13 4 5 
Miscellaneous 13 2 16 3 0 
Total 142 134 127 149 43 
SouRcE.-See n. 58. 
officials hailed from the Tuscan and especially the Florentine patriciate. 77 In their 
memoranda they sought to affirm their loyalty to their superiors and to safeguard 
their own political or financial interests. Their decisions nonetheless created a 
freer marketplace. In part, that outcome depended on supplication procedures 
and on poor monitoring from Florence. At a deeper level it was owing to a fun-
damental solidarity between merchants and officials in Livorno. 
Officials relied on merchants for information when investigating a supplica-
tion, as we have seen, but they also secured merchant cooperation in judicial 
cases and in managing tax collection. Customs duties in particular posed prob-
lems, as the policies associated with the free port complicated rather than sim-
plified procedures until the Reform of 1676. Merchants paid duties not upon 
entry of their goods but only upon their eventual sale or re-export. Officials 
therefore had to monitor wares in storage as well as all marketplace transactions. 
The bookkeeping demands were formidable. As Attavanti put it, speaking of 
why it was unreasonable to settle all outstanding accounts in December, "that 
order was issued when the port of Livorno was still at a tender age, when com-
77 Among governors, the outliers were Giovanni Canaviglia (from Naples) and Gio-
vanni Manoli Volterra (a Greek Uniate). Among customs directors, Paolo Poltri and Fran-
cesco Terriesi were of relatively modest origins. Many subordinate customs officers were 
also from important families . For the list of officeholders I have consulted ASF, MM, 4 I 4, 
Niccolo Arrighi's Teatro di Grazia e di Giustizia, ff. 99- 102, and Aglietti, 1 go verna tori. I 
relied on Litchfield's list of the Florentine patriciate (Emergence of a Bureaucracy, 364-
82) to determine the status of an officeholder. 
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merce was just getting started, and it was easy for the customs officer to fulfill the 
regulation punctually. Since then business has always increased- to the benefit 
of Your Highness- and as a result it has become difficult even for previous 
customs officers to observe the full rigor of this law."78 Opportunities for de-
frauding the customs were rife in Livomo, and officials went out of their way to 
cultivate good relations with merchants- in part to ensure the orderly payment 
of dues. 
Official collaboration with merchants readily slipped into collusion. Merchants 
had three general incentives for skirting the law: they wanted to minimize the 
time their wares or ships spent in quarantine; they wished to pay fewer taxes on 
goods they imported or sold in Livorno; and they ought to smuggle their goods 
beyond the customs cordon that separated the port city from the Tuscan hinter-
land. Officials were willing to oblige them on all three counts. Quarantine pat-
ents were a salable commodity in Livorno despite ongoing efforts to reform the 
Health Board that regulated acce to the port.79 Moreover, officials frequently 
turned a blind eye to merchants who skimped on paying their duties, often by un-
derreporting the amount of goods they imported into Livomo, and they rarely 
took a hard line against people who tried to smuggle things into Tuscany. Bribery 
of customs officers was pervasive.80 Liberty and licentiousness went hand in 
hand in Livomo. 
Constant (and sometimes illicit) cooperation nourished the habits of consen-
sus that reigned in Livomo. In its early days, merchants negotiated directly with 
local officials over a host of matters by means of supplications. That changed as 
the number of merchants in the city and, in the eyes of officialdom, the com-
plexity of its affairs grew. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there 
were perhaps twenty-three merchants in the city, including brokers. That figure 
grew to almost 300 businessmen by 1642.8 1 Increasingly, officials found it eas-
ier to negotiate with consuls or other representatives than with the entire en-
semble of merchants in the city. For example, when Livorno faced a scarcity of 
Spanish reale in the winter of 1644- 45, the grand duke saw an opportunity 
to establish Florentine coin as the only tender in Livorno. Commodities would 
be exchanged in Tuscan coinage pegged to a specific exchange rate. The gover-
78 ASF, MP, 2163 , f. 644, 03/08/ 1646. 
79 Carlo M. Cipolla, 1/ burocrate e if marinaio: La "Sanita " toscana e le tribolazioni 
degli inglesi a Livorno nel XVII secolo (Bologna 1992) 52 and 57. 
80 ' ' 
. Jean-Claude Waquet, Corruption: Ethics and Power in Florence, 1600-1 770 (Carn-
bndge, 1991 ); Waquet, "Aux marges de l' impot: Fraudeurs et contrebandiers dans Ia 
Toscane du XVIII siecle," in LafLScalite et ses implications sociales en ltalie et en France 
aux XV!le et XV/1/e sitk les (Rome, 1980), 75- 94; and Waquet, Le grand-duche de Tos-
cane sous les derniers Medicis. 
81 The 160 I and 1642 figures come from Fasano Guarini "La Popolazione " 203 and 
212. , , 
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nor and the customs director began to canvass merchant opinion, which initially 
seemed unfavorable to the change. The governor therefore convoked the mer-
chant community to discuss monetary reform and urged them to think carefully 
about a compromise position. The chaotic meeting broke up without resolutio~. 
The governor's account portrays the challenge of managing consensus m LI-
vorno when every merchant had a voice: 
The English and Dutch wanted to be able to negotiate in every kind of currency, including 
local pieces of eight or doubloons; the Florentines wer_e soon of two mmds, and likewise 
the French fell into the same division. Faced with this great confusion (for there were 
many [merchants] present) and without hope of a genuine resolution, l begged these 
gentlemen to be satisfied if each nation selected two people to gather the opmwn of their 
nation and convey to me in writing their view of the matter
82 
In this case, the opinion of the English and Dutch communities as conveyed by 
their deputies prevailed. The free circulation of all currencies according to m~r­
ket prices remained the custom of the port. When historians speak ?f negotia-
tions in the port, they should imagine local officials spendmg hours m the gov-
ernor's palace or the customs house trying to get the city's premier merchants to 
agree with one another on matters ranging from technocrat~c best practi~es to 
fiscal policy. They listened carefully to merchants while trymg to steer discu~­
sions in directions that would be amenable to their superiors in Florence. This 
process of negotiation was ultimately backed by th~ thre~t, rarely voiced, that 
merchants could take their business elsewhere. But m da1ly practice, norms of 
consensus were fostered more by the bonds of collaboration and collusion than 
by geopolitics. 
III. lNSTITUfiONS AND CoMMERCIAL THOUGHT 
Livorno provides an example of how organizational dynamics sha~e_d an. im-
portant concept of early modem political economy. When the MediCI decided 
to transform Livorno's infrastructure and legislative framework, the term "free 
port" signified merely a "port with privileges." It referred to the ability of for-
eigners to settle in Livomo regardless of ethnicity. The phrase acquired a "gen-
eral notion of unrestrained liberty" as well as a precise rubric of policies through 
memoranda produced according to local institutional Jogics.83 The state was im-
plicated in these institutions and indeed had created them, but it was not 
necessarily either their driving force or capable of directing their development. 
Historians of political economy, focused on concerns about imperial rivalry or 
"taming the passions" of subjects, should direct their attention to institutions as 
82 ASF, MP, 2160, f. 34, 01 / 13/ 1645. 
83 Compare ASL, Govemo, I 025, ins. 13. 
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well. 84 While those themes were crucial for introducing cultural and intellectual 
elites to the problem of economic growth, much writing on commercial matters 
during the seventeenth century took place with more practical aims in view. 
Historians have often linked free ports to the purposive intervention of the state 
in the economy and the aggressive commercial competition of the mercantilist 
era. It is more accurate to view the evolution of free ports as part of the haphazard 
development of institutions for regulating economic life, of bodies instituted to 
serve the state's new commercial goals but readily slipping beyond their grasp: in 
the case ofLivomo, the Customs Office and the Governor's Office. 
The system of supplications was deeply embedded in the larger structure of 
the Medici's organization and use of commercial information. Contrary to some 
historiography that has glorified the efficiency of early modern information man-
agement, neither the central government nor the local bureaucracies in Livorno 
had the capacity to utilize their archives effectively for most commercial mat-
ters.85 Supplications were an important vehicle for discussion about political 
economy precisely because the state lacked a body for handling similar mate-
rial. The state machinery for processing supplications was not adept at calibrat-
ing Tuscan commercial strategy; the system was erected to make judicial de-
cisions rather than to revise ongoing projects. The central government rarely 
issued follow-ups or excavated information from its archives. There were no 
routine inquiries into commerce and no forums for debating industrial goals. In-
stead, when merchants or artisans crafted a supplication over a particular ques-
84 Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism (London, 1955); D. C. Coleman, ed., Revisions in 
Mercantilism (London, 1969); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy: 
Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, NY, 
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Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760 (Cambridge, 2005); Sophus A. Reinert, 
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Elena Fasano Guanru and Mano Rosa, eds., L'informazione politica in Italia (secoli XVI-
XVIII) (Pisa, 2001); Randolph Head, "Knowing Like a State: The Transformation of 
Political ~_owledge in Swiss Archives," Journal of Modem History 75 , no. 4 (2003): 
745-82; Filippo de VIvo, Information and Communication in Venice: Rethinking Early 
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Management in Early Modem Europe: The Case of the Society of Jesus," Journal of 
Early Modem History 12 (2008): 539-63; Jacob Soli, The Information Master: Jean-
Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor, MI, 2009). A few writers 
have emph~sized systemic informational failures. For instance, De Vivo has explored 
th~ unmtentlonal consequences of the Venetian government's efforts to manipulate public 
opmion dunng the Interdiction Crisis (238- 48). My study pursues the trajectory explored 
by Parker: The Grand Strategy of Philip 11 ( ch. I ), in his discussion of the Spanish bu-
reaucracy s mabihty to adjust imperial strategy proactively in light of experience. 
Managing Free Trade in Harty Moaern nurup<:: J<..J 
· the Customs Office and the Governor's Office were responsible for dis-
tiOn, .11 . I' t covering precedents in the records of their chancellery, gn mg supp Ican s on 
the details of their requests, and offering whatever thoughts occurred to ~hem on 
the case at hand. To facilitate their tasks, offices kept books of rescnpts that 
eserved the grand dukes ' decisions in previous matters and mdexed Important 
~~siness by subject. The meticulousness of their record keeping should not ~e 
exaggerated, however, and information gathering relied more on face-to-face dis-
cussion than on archival research. . . 
The supplication process generated thousands of memoranda ( memona~t ~. It 
is important to distinguish this genre from other forn:s ofwntmg about poht1~al 
economy, such as published pamphlets or legal treatises. ~he m.emor~dum In-
vestigated questions offact and only rarely offered theoretical discussions. As a 
result, their writers usually progressed from the particular to the general, from the 
merits of the case at hand to a general approach to the issue. Moreover, before 
offering his opinion, the writer usually presented a list of precedents that .bore 
on the decision. Of course, due to the disorganization of the archives, the hst of 
precedents was often incomplete and sometimes done by memory. ~ost impor-
tantly, memoranda were set in a policy process. They were composed m response 
to a privy secretary's request for more information and were supposed to .form 
the grounds for a decision. Because the genre was so coherent, a~ ambitious 
writer could also use his brief strategically, as a platform for showcasmg h1s Ideas 
or to urge a new departure in policy. . . 
The signal importance of the memorandum for political economy m Livo.rno 
may be established by comparing it to the larger universe of economic w~ting. 
Ducal secretaries regularly received information in the form of news, digests, 
and the letters of agents who had standing orders to report on commercial de-
velopments. Take, for instance, Jan Vander Neesen, a seventeenth-century. Flem-
ish man investigating the possibility of establishing direct commerc1~l t1~s be-
tween Livorno and the Indies. Van der Neesen delved into the orgamzat10n of 
the Dutch East India Company, transmitted news about trade, and forwarded 
books on navigation to his contacts in Florence.86 Officials in Livorno its~lf 
also collected economic information. The captain of the port sent almost da1ly 
briefs to Florence detailing the provenance and cargos of ships that arrived in 
Livorno. His reports served an essentially military and political purpos~, to m?n-
itor the armaments passing through the port. The Health Board transmitted stm-
ilar information for ships arriving with suspect health patents to prevent the 
spread of plague to the port. In addition, every year the Customs Office prepared 
a surnrnary balance sheet in order to track government revenues. All of these 
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records have been exploited by modem historians to trace the development of 
Livomo's trade, although they served other purposes in the seventeenth century. 
Only the customs balance was occasionally used in contemporary discussions 
of the free port. 
Officials had difficulty exploiting the torrent of information that came their 
wa.y. Often it was buried in the personal archives of the recipient. Busy secre-
tanes rarely dug through their records to build a picture of trading opportunities 
in Holland (for example) or to compile trends for the price of grain in Livomo. 
They did not use their archives to assess ties between Livomo and its increas-
ingly estranged Tuscan hinterland; to analyze the contradictory relationship be-
tween policies that favored the port of deposit versus those that favored mari-
time expansion; or to track the policies of rival ports, apart from taking note of 
ma~or legislation issued by competitors. Instead, secretaries almost always asked 
the1r usual correspondents to pen responses to specific questions even when they 
could have excavated such information from their own troves of letters, memos, 
and news reports. Most everyday business consisted of just such questions and 
answers, since it would have been impossible to index all of the proper names 
mentioned in letters, let alone all of the subject matters. This procedure meant 
that m~y memoranda merely rehashed data or perspectives that had been pre-
sented p1ecemeal over previous correspondence. Like the most advanced of their 
contemporaries in Venice or Spain, Tuscan secretaries organized their files ac-
cording to strategic objectives and drew upon them when producing general 
state~ent.s of policy. 87 Most commercial information escaped their principles of 
organ1zatwn, however. Crucial matters pertaining to the free port were delegated 
to local officials working through memoranda. 
Another reason the memorandum reigned supreme was the absence of pub-
lished treatises on political economy in seventeenth-century Tuscany. The late 
Renaissance had witnessed a florescence of writing on commercial matters. The 
ern Europe, ed. Hans Cools, Marika Keblusek, and Badeloch Noldus (Hilversum, 2006), 
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Europe and the Medzterranean zn the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. Antonella 
Allflle~to (M1lan, 2011 ), 55-fJ7. These works emphasize the quality of the Medici in-
formation network. I agree, but I would observe that its translation into policy outcomes 
was effic1ent only for "hot" political or commercial affairs. 
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rnost original writer was undoubtedly Antonio Serra, whose 1613 treatise~­
alyzed the difference between industrial economies and agricultural economies. 
Serra showed that industry enjoyed increasing returns to scale, whereas cultiva-
tion suffered from diminishing returns to scale, and his work, virtually unknown 
in the seventeenth century, had a profound impact on Enlightenment thinkers . 
But Serra was just one of several Italian thinkers who applied historical or an~ 
alytic reason to the sources of state wealth. Th~ Tuscan ~em~~o Davanzat~ 
wrote treatises on money and agriculture, and h1s cornpatnot F1hppo Sassettl 
wrote a discourse on commerce and port cities. The most influential author of 
the late Renaissance, however, was Giovanni Botero. As a secretary to the prom-
inent Borromeo family of Milan, Botero had first-hand knowledge of the po-
litical machinations that drove European politics. He incorporated his insights 
into The Reason of State, which was published in 1589 and saw many subse-
quent editions.88 
The problem was that commercial writings dealt with matters that were 
patently too political for Tuscan subjects to publish. Caroline .Callard h~s shown 
that by the early seventeenth century, virtually all pubhcatwn touchmg upon 
political life in Tuscany came to a halt as the Medici grand dukes squelched 
public discussion of the arcana imperii.89 Perhaps becau.se B.otero .had suc-
ceeded so well in marrying it to reason of state, commercml d1scuss1on could 
not be framed in a politically neutral way. In addition, the fecklessness of rep-
resentative institutions meant that there was little incentive to court popular 
opinion by publishing on political economy. The major representative bodies in 
Tuscany were the forty-eight-person Senate and the Council of200. The mem-
bers of both were handpicked by the grand duke, but these were honors that 
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into The Reason of State, which was published in 1589 and saw many subse-
quent editions.88 
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carried no real power. The supremacy of the Medici and the narrow political 
class discouraged publication of commercial reflection. Supplications therefore 
provided the context. for many discussions about political economy. The long 
sunset of the MediCI dynasty began in the early eighteenth century when it 
became clear that the last prince of the house, Gian Gastone (r. 1723- 37) , would 
be unable to prod~ce an heir. Tuscans began publishing texts asserting the in-
dependence ofthe1r republic in a failed effort to forestall a foreign succession.90 
They also started publishing economic texts again, first with Sallustio Bandini's 
Discourse on the Maremma ( 1739). The grand duchy went on to have one of 
the most vib~antexplorations of political economy in Enlightenment Europe.91 
D~fferent mstltutional arrangements may well have changed the nature of 
poht1cal economy in Medici Tuscany. Other countries had more regular feed-
hac~ mechan.isms for linking policy and commercial strategy. For example, in 
Vemce the .~mque Savi alia Mercanzia (Trade Board) played an active role in 
vettmg pet1t10ns on economic matters and occasionally proposed new mea-
sures.92 Under the system of intendants supervised by Colbert, France had a 
cadre of.agent~ well trained in the mercantile arts, in gathering information, and 
~n supenntendmg state-backed projects.93 The presence of representative bod-
Ies mattered, too. The Collegi in Genoa were the major venues in which the 
" navalist" faction sought to implement their policy of commercial expansion. 
T~ey unleashed a. flurry of publications in the mid-seventeenth century glori-
fymg the mercantile and seafaring identity of their city in order to win public 
sup~ort.94 The English ruling class was larger and more permeable than Genoa 's, 
and m a state of rapid evolution owing to economic expansion and political con-
troversy. Commercial writers employed back-room dealing as well as extensive 
pamphleteering to influence Crown and Parliament.95 
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Managing Free Trade in barty Moaem c-urupt:. 
Throughout Europe, however, many discussions about the econ~my occurred 
· olitical or mercantile bodies erected for other purposes: the gUJlds, customs Ul p . h . i.' 
houses, monopoly companies, and so forth that had the1r own mec amsms tOr 
supervising or manipulating some dimension of the economy. The e~rly .h1s~ory 
f 
olitical economy has a bureaucratic flavor to it because these mstJtut10ns 
o p . . · ·d 96 H. 
were often the primary ones charged w1th evaluatmg econom1c 1 .eas. Jsto-
rians of seventeenth-century political economy have focused on pnnted sources 
and powerful states. They have dwelt on Holland, France, and England and mar-
ginalized Italy after the publication of Serra's ~eatise in 1613, _rerhap~ because 
inhabitants of the peninsula d1d not publish w1dely on the subject untll the En-
lightenment.97 The example of the free port indicates that print :vas not the only 
).tal medium in the development of early modem commercml thought, and v l . 
historians' focus on printed sources obscures debates that occurred large y m 
manuscript.98 Manuscript discussions often unfolded in the context of the messy 
institutions described here, with their poorly supervised officials, disorganized 
archives, peculiar procedures, and insistent interest groups. To the extent that 
the free port is an illustrative example, historians of economic thought must pay 
closer attention to the organizational contexts that were the venues for manu-
script production. National traditions of political economy we:e e.mb~dded in 
local intellectual life as well as local institutions. Some of these mstltutwns may 
have been insulated from the larger world. Those of Livomo, so responsive to 
an international cadre of merchants and artisans, were not. 
IV. CoNCLUSION: FREE PoRTS IN EARLY MooERN EuROPE 
The institutional perspective helps explain the perplexing variety of policies 
that fell under the aegis of the free port. The free port of Marseilles, for example, 
sharply discriminated against non-native shipping. Other ports constituted a 
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special zone within a city that otherwise remained untouched by free trade, as in 
Genoa. The port of Tangier was free only for certain trade routes since the 
English mandated that goods shipped from there to other English territories be 
carried aboard English vessels. The ports in the Caribbean exempted only those 
goods that did not compete with a mother country's domestic industries. Schol-
ars have attributed the diversity of free ports largely to the geopolitical situation 
of each. This explanation carries some weight in accounting for differences be-
tween cities such as Marseilles and Livorno, or between European and Carib-
bean ports. It has less traction with regard to the variety of free ports among Ital-
ian states. Italian free ports shared a general geopolitical outlook: most of them 
belonged to rich but small, second-rate powers at the crossroads of Mediterra-
nean trade. But none experienced the success of Livorno. 
The policy process deeply affected the articulation of free ports. Despite sim-
ilar legislative intent, new policies were implemented in contexts very different 
from that of the Tuscan port. Most observers attributed Livorno 's success to the 
Livornina. Ferdinanda 's legislation was recalled in laws issued for Nice ( 1648), 
Modena ( 1652), Genoa ( 1654), Messina ( 1719), and Naples ( 1739) .99 It also had 
an important impact on legislation in Marseilles and Ancona. The military 
engineer Sir Henry Sheeres complained that Tangier, declared a free port by 
Charles ll in 1662, lacked a defined "constitution" laying out its actual privi-
leges like the one Livomo had.100 As we have seen, however, ascribing Livor-
no 's success to its formal legislation is a gross oversimplification. Livorno 's free 
port was a complex of formal and informal practices embedded in a larger in-
stitutional matrix. It was nourished not only by Ferdinanda's legislation but 
above all by the lack of effective central oversight and the collaborative ties 
that bonded merchants and officials in Livomo. The ensemble of administrative 
practices, precedents, and assumptions that constituted the free port of Livorno 
could not be copied simply by lowering customs duties or by welcoming foreign 
settlers. 
Contemporary observers often failed to appreciate the institutional complex-
ity of free ports, with important consequences for policy as well as for how En-
lightenment thinkers handled them during the formative period of European 
political economy. In 1743 the Neapolitan economist Carlo Antonio Broggia 
accused Italians of having "prostituted" their commerce to foreigners through 
their establishment of free ports.10 1 The more illustrious Antonio Genovesi , who 
held the first chair of political economy in Italy, likewise criticized free ports as 
99 Frattarelli Fischer, Vivere fuori dal ghetto, 55. 
100 Heruy Sheeres, A Discourse Touching Tanger in a Letter to a Person of Quality 
(London, 1680), 46-47. 
10 1 Carlo Antonio Broggia, Trattato de' tributi, delle monete, e del tributi politico della 
sanita (Naples, 1743 ), 97-121. 
Manag ing Free Trade in Early Modern burope JL.'::J 
· sts , 102 Free ports promoted a passive commerce 
"the idol of many economl . . .l d the liberty of Italian states, and, for 
that benefited only foredigne~, l~mfi peltan !~an thinkers turned against free ports at 
. en corrupte CIVIC 1 e. f fr Broggta, ev b c:arther afield began to see them as models o ee 
e time that o servers t• . h. 
the sam . M tthew Decker made an eloquent appeal to free ports m IS case 
trade m actwn. ~ . IOJ Adam Smith too opined in his university lectures 
against tra~e restncttbons.ll be mad'e a free port , by which he meant that 
h t "Britam should y a means ' . . d d fi . 
t a duties should be abolished, navigation laws elumna~e , an or~lgn 
customs . . B .. h rt 104 The experience of L1vomo prov1ded 
hants admitted mto ntiS po s. h d h 
mere unition for supporters and for critics of free ports: ~n the one an ' t e ~ a flourishing zone of religious tolerance and ratiOnal customs regula-
c.lty wa~ the other its trade was managed by foreign merchants and foste:ed by 
tlo;:; l~cit ties be~een officials and businessmen. Free port~ su~h as a Llvo~o 
co p 'l between Enlightenment programs of comrnerctal nvalry and pnn-
sat uneas1 Y 
ciples of laissez-faire. 
102 Antonio Genovesi, Lezioni di commercia o sia di economia civile (Bassano, 1769), 
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(Lo~on , 1 744), 30,,?~~ 9~~ Dated 1766," in Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, 
Adam Smtth, PS . (0 c. d 1978) 514 The lectures were probably delivered 
D. D. Raphael, and P. G. tem. x.or , , · 
in 1763--64 (editors' introductton, 5). 
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